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Dismembering the Meat Industry
Piece by Piece:
The Value of Federalism to Farm Animals
Colin Kreuziger*
In fact if one person is unkind to an animal it is considered to
be cruelty, but where a lot of people are unkind to a lot of
animals, especially in the name of commerce, the cruelty is
condoned and, once large sums of money are at stake, will be
defended to the last by otherwise intelligent people.'
Introduction
The agribusiness industry raises and slaughters a staggering
number of farm animals 2 each year in the United States for use as
food. 3 The quality of life of farm animals has steadily deteriorated
since the advent of the factory farm. 4 Farm animals frequently
live in horrendous conditions,5 endure severely inhumane
treatment, 6 and suffer grotesque deaths.7 Despite increasing
evidence of severe animal abuse by the agribusiness industry,
there is little to no protection of farm animals at the state or
federal level.8 Although the current legal regime offers little
protection to any type of animal, farm animals occupy a
particularly disfavored position in the legal hierarchy. 9
Most critics argue that legislative action at the federal level
is necessary to remedy the systemic abuses in the farmed-animal

* J.D. expected 2006, University of Minnesota Law School. I would like to thank
my wife Cara, my parents, my parents-in-law, and my cat, Mongi, for their love and
support. I would also like to acknowledge the editors and staff of this Journal,
particularly Jonathan Krieger, for their assistance. Finally, I am grateful to
Professor Corwin R. Kruse for his helpful suggestions.
1. RUTH HARRISON, ANIMAL MACHINES 144-45 (1964).

2. For purposes of this article, the term "farm animals" refers to those animals
raised for use as food.
3. See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 37-46 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 49-65, 82-96 and accompanying text.
9. See infra Part II.
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industry.10 As a result, advocates for farm animals or other
animals have frequently been associated with other political
movements that tend to support a more active federal
government." This Article contends that more opportunities are
2
available to farm animal advocates at the state and local levels.'
Specific emphasis will be placed on the advantages of a piecemeal
approach to such legislation and the benefits that could come to
farm animal advocates from a more robust federalism.' 8
Part I catalogs the growing body of evidence indicating that
the farmed-animal industry subjects farm animals to cruel
In
treatment and farm animals suffer greatly as a result.
particular, farm animals suffer from the conditions of the farm
animal environment, physical abuse, and inhumane slaughter
methods.14 Part II of this Article focuses on current federal, state,
and local laws that purport to protect farm animals from human
cruelty, and the deficiencies of these laws.' 5 This section examines
federal animal protection law,' 6 as well as state anti-cruelty
statutes. 17
In addition, Part II examines recent legislative
attempts to protect farm animals at both the federal and state
levels.' 8 Part III presents an overview of the disparate approaches
to securing better treatment for all animals with an emphasis on
the distinction between the animal rights and animal welfare
movements in the United States and the common ground between
the two movements.' 9 Part IV explores the potential of pursuing
reform at both the federal and state levels. 20 This section features
a comparative analysis of the practical, constitutional, and
structural difficulties that advocates for social change face at the
21
federal and state levels,
Part V argues that farm animal advocates should focus their
efforts on legislation at the state and local levels. 22 This section
discusses the problems inherent in the current federal and state

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part V.B.
See infra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.A.1.
See infra Part II.B.1.
See infra Parts II.A.2, II.B.2.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part V.
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legislative framework with respect to the problem of farm animal
cruelty. 23 This section also argues that the animal rights and
animal welfare movements need to coalesce around an
incremental strategy in the legal arena. 24 Part VI assesses the
25
potential pitfalls of pursuing legal reform at the state level.
Specifically,
this
section explores questions
of federal
preemption, 26 dormant Commerce Clause analysis, 27 and the
reactionary use of state political mechanisms to stymie the growth
of animal protection legislation. 28 Part VI will also consider the
29
benefits of increased state autonomy to farm animal advocates.
I.

The Development of the Factory Farm and Its
Deleterious Effects on Farm Animals

The United States agribusiness industry slaughters billions
of farm animals each year in order to produce vast quantities of
food for United States residents.30 Farmed animals make up the
vast majority of all animals that humans interact with in the
United States. 31 The popular image of agribusiness as one in
which animals are raised on a pastoral farm is a fantastic
illusion. 32
In the United States, large-scale, factory-style

23. See infra Part V.A.
24. See infra Part V.B.
25. See infra Part VI.
26. See infra Part VI.A.
27. See infra Part VI.B.
28. See infra Part VI.D.
29. See infra Part VI.C.
30. See Gary L. Francione, Animals-Property or Persons?, in ANIMAL RIGHTS:
CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 109 (Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C.
Nussbaum eds., 2004) [hereinafter ANIMAL RIGHTS] (stating "according to the U.S.
Department of Agriculture, we kill more than 8 billion animals a year for food");
Note, Challenging Concentration of Control in the American Meat Industry, 117
HARv. L. REV. 2643, 2643 (2004) [hereinafter Note] (estimating that 9.5 billion
animals are "raised and butchered each year"); see also R.R. Von Kaufman & Hank
Fitzhugh, The Importance of Livestock for the World's Poor, in PERSPECTIVES IN
WORLD FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 2004 149 (Colin G. Scanes & John A. Miranowski
eds., 2004) (containing statistics that demonstrate that the U.S. produced 35
million metric tons of meat in 1997).
31. See David J. Wolfson & Mariann Sullivan, Foxes in the Hen House:
Animals, Agribusiness and the Law: A Modern American Fable, in ANIMAL RIGHTS,
supra note 30, at 206 (demonstrating that farmed animals make up 98 percent of
all animals "with whom humans interact in the United States").
32. See DR. MICHAEL W. Fox, AGRICIDE: THE HIDDEN CRISIS THAT AFFECTS US
ALL 1 (1986) (discussing the inaccurate perception of idyllic farms); Note, supra
note 30, at 2643 ("[M]ost of the animals now raised for meat processors like
Smithfield are confined in factory farms or feedlots that bear little resemblance to
popular notions of 'Heartland' farms."); C. DAVID COATS, OLD MACDONALD'S
FACTORY FARM: THE MYTH OF THE TRADITIONAL FARM AND THE SHOCKING TRUTH
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operations that raise high volumes of animals for slaughter have
largely supplanted the traditional family farm. 33 As factory-style
farms confine and raise more -and more animals for the meat
industry, the overall number of farms is dramatically reduced. 34 A
decline of farming operations tends to occur in states that have
less permissive regulatory environments with respect to factory
farming. 35
Factory farms migrate to states with relatively
permissive agribusiness regulations as corporate farmers
recognize the cost savings available in such permissive
36
jurisdictions.
The result of the advent of the factory farm is a
37
corresponding deterioration in the well-being of farm animals.
One of the specific consequences of this development is

ABOUT ANIMAL SUFFERING IN TODAY'S AGRIBUSINESS 19 (1989) (explaining the
stark difference between the farm animal life portrayed in children's books and the
reality of factory farms).
33. See TERENCE J. CENTNER, EMPTY PASTURES: CONFINED ANIMALS AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE RURAL LANDSCAPE 31 (2004) ('CThe consolidation rampant
within the production of animals has made it difficult to find a yeoman-family
farmer."); JEFFREY MOUSSAIEFF MASSON, THE PIG WHO SANG TO THE MOON: THE
EMOTIONAL WORLD OF FARM ANIMALS 236-37 (2003) (observing that four
agribusiness firms "control 82 percent of beef, 75 percent of hogs and sheep, and
half of chickens"); Christopher A. Novak, Agriculture's New Environmental
Battleground: The Preemption of County Livestock Regulations, 5 DRAKE J. AGRIC.
L. 429, 430 (2000) ('The modernization of the United States' agricultural industry
has transformed once bucolic family farms into multi-national agricultural
corporations."). But see Jim Chen & Edward S. Adams, Feudalism Unmodified:
Discourses on Farms and Firms, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 361, 372 (1997) (arguing that
"[a] trivial proportion-less than half of one percent--of all American farms are
owned by nonfamily-owned corporations").
34. See CENTNER, supra note 33, at 19 ("Statistics show that the number of
farms has dwindled by 50 percent since 1960."); Note, supra note 30, at 2645-51
(discussing horizontal and vertical integration in the meat industry and the
corresponding decline in the number of farms raising animals). Centner also notes
that certain individual states have seen a dramatic increase in the amount of farm
animals while other states have seen substantial decline. CENTNER, supra note 33,
at 22-23 (discussing the concentration of cattle in Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas,
hogs in North Carolina, and dairy cows in California, and the corresponding decline
of production in other states).
35. See Steven C. Bahls, Preservation of Family Farms-The Way Ahead, 45
DRAKE L. REV. 311, 314 (1997) (arguing that corporate farming builds competitive
strength in states with weaker anti-corporate farming legislation).
36. Id.
37. See Chris Mullin, Why I Do Not Eat Meat, in THE MEAT BUSINESS:
DEVOURING A HEALTHY PLANET 61 (Geoff Tansey & Joyce D'Silva eds., 1999) ('The
last 40 years have seen the principles of mass production introduced into the
farmyard. In the name of the great god efficiency, production systems have been
devised that inflict unspeakable suffering on calves, pigs, chickens and turkeys
throughout their short and miserable lives."); COATS, supra note 32, at 20-22
(discussing the connection between factory farming and the corresponding increase
in cruel treatment).
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degradation of the physical environment in which farm animals
live. 38 For example, most farm animals are confined in tiny spaces
that severely restrict their freedom of movement.3 9 In addition to
cramped conditions, many farm animals are completely deprived
of sunlight exposure. 40 The frequent results of such maltreatment
38. See Holly Cheever, Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations: The Bigger
Picture,5 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK 43, 45 (2000). Cheever states:
In the interests of increasing profit margins by cramming the maximal
numbers of animals into the minimal amount of space, animals are denied
the opportunity to go outside, to exist in their evolutionarily determined
natural social groupings (note that all of the "food animal" species are
intensely social beings), to eat a natural diet, and to follow their natural
biorhythms and hormonal patterns for reproduction.
Id.
39. See id. at 45-46 (describing the physical environment that chickens and veal
Pigs raised in intensive
calves raised in intensive confinement endure).
confinement usually are kept in cages so small that they cannot turn around. See
CENTNER, supra note 33, at 32 (observing that a sow raised in a production barn
has her movement 'limited to several inches sideways or forward and back");
Steven J. Havercamp, Are Moderate Animal Welfare Laws and a Sustainable
Agricultural Economy Mutually Exclusive? Laws, Moral Implications, and
Recommendations, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 645, 654 (1998) (observing that sows raised
on factory farms "spend most of their lives in narrow metal crates barely larger
than their bodies"). Chickens are also raised in extremely confined environments.
See Nicole Fox, The Inadequate Protection of Animals Against Cruel Animal
Husbandry Practices Under United States Law, 17 WHITT1IER L. REV. 145, 152
(1995). Fox states that chickens used for egg production are
placed into cages which average 12-by-20 inches in size (with five chickens
per cage). Researchers have found that the cage size necessary for five
chickens to turn around with ease is at least sixteen by fourty-one [sic] and
a half inches. Therefore, it is impossible for the chickens to turn around
with ease in the 12-by-20 inch cage.
Id. (citation omitted). Similarly, veal calves are raised in extremely confined
physical environments. See Amy Mosel, What About Wilbur? Proposinga Federal
Statute to Provide Minimum Humane Living Conditions for Farm Animals Raised
for Food Production,27 DAYTON L. REV. 133, 148 (2001) ("Hundreds of thousands of
veal calves live chained in wooden crates so small they cannot walk, turn around or
even move."). Dairy cattle are similarly confined in tiny spaces that severely limit
their mobility. See COATS, supra note 32, at 53 ("[Many dairy cows] can only eat,
lactate, and defecate. They can neither turn around, groom themselves, nor scratch
an itch.
). By contrast, beef cattle are usually not raised in intensive
confinement for their entire lives. See id. at 71 (commenting that beef cattle often
run freely on the range for six to eight months before being confined in feedlots);
Barbara O'Brien, Animal Welfare Reform and the Magic Bullet: The Use and Abuse
of Subtherapeutic Doses of Antibiotics in Livestock, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 407, 421
(1996) (stating that beef cattle are usually allowed to graze for at least a year
before they are transferred to feedlots). Conditions at the feedlot are similar to
intensive confinement environments suffered by other animals. See COATS, supra
note 32, at 72 (observing that "[a]nimals on feedlots are crowded together, denied
exercise, and overfed so they gain weight fast").
40. See Mullin, supra note 37, at 61 (observing that most broiler chickens
never see daylight"); see also Thomas A. Decapo, Challenging Objectionable
Animal Treatment with the Shareholder Proxy ProposalRule, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV.
119, 124 (describing practice of confining chickens in total darkness to keep them
from fighting one another); Mosel, supra note 39, at 146 (discussing practice of
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are abnormal behaviors and illnesses not typically observed in
1
farm animals.4
Although abnormal farm animal behaviors and illnesses
might appear to represent a threat to the profitability of the
agribusiness corporations that raise farm animals for use as food,
the agribusiness industry compensates for these costs with a
variety of practices that inflict suffering on farm animals in
exchange for profit. 42 For example, it is cost efficient for chickens
to be raised in environments that are conducive to illness and
excessive pecking because chickens are injected with huge doses of
antibiotics and debeaked to compensate. 43 These cruel practices
surely would be considered torture if inflicted on a human or a
companion animal. 44 In addition to the cruelty that farm animals
suffer while living at the factory farm, they also suffer abuse while
45
they are transported from the factory to the slaughterhouse.
raising chickens in total darkness to "keep them calm"). Pigs are also kept in total
darkness for the vast majority of their short lives. See Betsy Tao, A Stitch in Time:
Addressing the Environmental, Health, and Animal Welfare Effects of China's
Expanding Meat Industry, 15 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 343 (2003) (observing
that in a typical total confinement setting pigs "do not see sunlight until the day
they are taken to slaughter").
41. See Cheever, supra note 38, at 45 (arguing that intensive confinement
results in "abnormal stereotypic and aggressive behaviors"). One striking example
of such abnormal behavior is the tendency of intensively confined pigs to chew the
tails and ears of other pigs. See COATS, supra note 32, at 33 (describing the biting
of tails and ears by bored pigs as coping mechanisms). Another common example of
abnormal behavior is excessive pecking by chickens that can eventually lead to the
death of weaker chickens. See id. at 86 (observing that "overcrowding and extreme
stress of the factory conditions are the real and direct causes" of this destructive
pecking).
42. See O'Brien, supra note 39, at 410. Debeaking is a particularly brutal
"surgery" that is performed without anesthesia. See COATS, supra note 32, at 85.
Coats describes debeaking:
Debeaking is the cutting off of either the entire tip of the beak or the top half
of the beak... . A worker jams the day-old chick's beak against a red-hot
(1500 F---800 C) metal blade for about two seconds. Part of the beak is
burnt off and the tissue that could regenerate the beak is destroyed.
Id.
43. See COATS, supra note 32, at 85.
44. See generally Mosel, supra note 39, at 146 (observing that in the production
of eggs "[u]seless males are casually dumped into plastic garbage bags where they
'suffocate under the weight of other chicks dumped on top of them"' (quoting Fox,
supra note 39, at 151)); Mullin, supra note 37, at 62 (describing castration of lambs,
debeaking of chickens, and tail clipping of pigs). Perhaps the most extreme
example of physical abuse in the form of neglect surfaces in the case of calves that
are raised to be used as veal. See Mosel, supra note 39, at 148 (discussing the
intentional starvation of calves to induce them to eat drug-laden feed that they
instinctively reject). See generally COATS, supra note 32 (discussing cruel practices
inflicted on pigs, dairy cows, veal calves, beef cattle, and chickens).
45. See Tao, supra note 40, at 344. Tao states:
USDA veterinarians have described a commonly accepted practice of
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When they arrive at the slaughterhouse, farm animals are
frequently slaughtered using inhumane methods such as stunning
Within animal
by electric shock and bleeding to death. 46
agriculture, increasingly cruel practices characterize the factory
farm model.47 This situation necessitates a survey of current and
proposed legislation to determine if an adequate legislative
framework exists for remedying animal abuse in the agribusiness
4
industry. 8
II. Legislation Purporting to Protect Animals
A. FederalLaw
1. The Current State of Federal Law
There is very little legislation at the federal level that
protects farm animals. 49 There are four primary federal statutes
transporting cattle in ninety to ninety-five degree weather, crammed on
trailers with so little ventilation and for so long that some animals collapse
from heat exhaustion. At the other extreme, cattle have also been
transported in open trailers, in minus-fifty degree weather, factoring in windchill.
Id.; see also COATS, supra note 32, at 99 (observing that "more than 700,000 calves
and cattle die each year due to transit-related injuries and diseases").
46. See HELENA NORBERG-HODGE ET AL., FROM THE GROUND UP: RETHINKING
INDUSTRIAL AGRICULTURE 27 (2001). Other cruel practices that are prevalent
include dismemberment and scalding while animals are still alive. See Laurie
Fulkerson, 2001 Legislative Review, 8 ANIMAL L. 259, 277 (2002) (discussing
videotape showing cows in the state of Washington "being skinned and having their
legs cut off, without having first been stunned"); Emilie Keturakis, 2002 Legislative
Review, 9 ANIMAL L. 331, 333 (2003) (reporting that many farm animals are
"frequently dismembered or scalded while still aware and conscious"); see also Tao,
supra note 40, at 344 (observing that "high production speeds in the slaughterhouse often result in live pigs, supposedly stunned, being lowered into vats of
scalding hot water to soften their skins"). Animals are frequently beaten by
slaughterhouse employees when they refuse to be slaughtered easily. See GAIL A.
EISNITZ, SLAUGHTERHOUSE: THE SHOCKING STORY OF GREED, NEGLECT, AND
INHUMANE TREATMENT INSIDE THE U.S. MEAT INDUSTRY 130 (1997) (recounting

interview with slaughterhouse employee indicating that cattle are beaten with
"whips, chains, shovels, hoes, [and] boards" to get them to move within the
slaughterhouse); SCULLY, supra note 39, at 283 (discussing conversations with
slaughterhouse employees that confirm hogs are beaten frequently when they
refuse to go quietly to slaughter). Chickens are still conscious when their throats
are sliced and they bleed to death. Id. at 166 (observing that other industrialized
nations render chickens unconscious before killing them while the practice in the
United States is to paralyze rather than render chickens unconscious).
47. See supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text.
48. See infra Part II.
49. See Mosel, supra note 39, at 138-44 (arguing that federal law fails to protect
farm animals); Jacqueline Tresl, The Broken Window: Laying Down the Law for
Animals, 26 S. ILL. U. L.J. 277, 285 (2002) ("[T]here is one classification of animal
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that deal directly with animal welfare. The Animal Welfare Act
("AWA")O is designed to protect animals that move in interstate
commerce, 51 particularly animals used in experiments, exhibitions,
or sold as companion animals. 52 The AWA specifically exempts
53
farm animals from its purview.
54
In addition to the AWA, the Twenty-Eight Hour Law
regulates the transportation conditions under which animals are
moved as part of interstate commerce. 55 The Twenty-Eight Hour
Law places a limit on the amount of time animals may be
transported without "unloading" the animals for food, water, and
rest. 56 However, animals may be confined for longer periods under
certain circumstances.5 7 In addition, any transporter of animals
may apply in writing for an extension of the usual twenty-eight
hour period.5 8 In order to prove a violation of the Twenty-Eight
that is denied most federal and state protection. That animal is the farm animal.").
50. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (2004).
51. See id. § 2131(2) (stating that one congressional policy objective of the
Animal Welfare Act is "to assure the humane treatment of animals during
transportation in commerce").
52. See id. § 2132(g) (defining the term "animal" as including dogs, cats,
monkeys, guinea pigs, hamsters, rabbits, and other animals "intended for use, for
research, testing, experimentation, or exhibition purposes, or as a pet").
53. See id. When describing what is an "animal," the statute states
such term excludes.., other farm animals, such as, but not limited to
livestock or poultry, used or intended for use as food or fiber, or livestock or
poultry used or intended for use for improving animal nutrition, breeding,
management, or production efficiency, or for improving the quality of food or
fiber.
Id. See, e.g., Mosel, supra note 39, at 140-41 (noting that the Animal Welfare Act
"specifically denies coverage to farm animals").
54. 49 U.S.C. § 80502 (2004).
55. See id. § 80502(a) (prescribing the amount of consecutive time that animals
may be confined without rest); id. § 80502(b) (fixing requirements for humane
unloading and feeding of animals that are being transported). By its terms, the
statute does not regulate the conditions that farm animals live under on a daily
basis. Fox, supra note 39, at 146.
56. See 49 U.S.C. § 80502(a)(1) (2004). Sheep may be confined for up to thirtysix consecutive hours under certain conditions. Id. § 80502(a)(2) ("Sheep may be
confined for an additional 8 consecutive hours without being unloaded when the 28hour period of confinement ends at night.").
57. See id. § 80502(a)(2)(A). Animals are allowed to be confined for "more than
28 hours when the animals cannot be unloaded because of accidental or
unavoidable causes that could not have been anticipated or avoided when being
careful." Id. Some commentators have suggested that the statute may still allow
for inhumane transportation of farm animals. See, e.g., Laura G. Kniaz, Animal
Liberation and the Law: Animals Board the Underground Railroad, 43 BUFF. L.
REV. 765, 785-86 (1995) (questioning whether the Twenty-Eight Hour Law serves
its purpose of humane transportation of animals).
58. See 49 U.S.C. § 80502(a)(2)(B) (2004) (allowing animals to be confined for
"36 consecutive hours when the owner or person having custody of animals being
transported requests, in writing and separate from a bill of lading or other rail
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Hour Law, the U.S. Attorney General must prove knowing and
willful violation of the law. 59 Many farm animals receive no
protection from the Twenty-Eight Hour Law because it does not
regulate the trucking industry, the major transporter of live
animals in the United States, and it does not apply to animals that
60
are shipped in intrastatecommerce.
A third federal statute, the Humane Methods of Livestock
Slaughter Act ("HMLSA")61 mandates that animals be slaughtered
in a humane way, in part to alleviate "needless suffering." 62 The
HMLSA also prescribes methods of slaughter that are deemed
humane, such as a single blow or gunshot that renders the animal
insensible to pain. 63 The HMLSA applies to a limited category of
farm animals. 64 Penalties for violation of the HMLSA are limited
and rarely imposed. 65
form, that the 28-hour period be extended to 36 hours").
59. See id. § 80502(d) (2004). According to this statute:
A rail carrier, express carrier, or common carrier (except by air or water), a
receiver, trustee, or lessee of one of those carriers, or an owner or master of a
vessel that knowingly and willfully violates this section is liable to the United
States Government for a civil penalty of at least $ 100 but not more than $
500 for each violation. On learning of a violation, the Attorney General shall
bring a civil action to collect the penalty in the district court of the United
States for the judicial district in which the violation occurred or the defendant
resides or does business.
Id.
60. See Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 31, at 208; David J. Wolfson, Beyond the
Law: Agribusiness and the Systemic Abuse of Animals Raised for Food or Food
Production,2 ANIMAL L. 123, 129 (1996) ("Federal law only applies to the interstate
transport of animals, not the transport of animals within a state.").
61. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1907 (2004).
62. Id. § 1901.
63. Id. § 1902(a) ("fI]n the case of cattle, calves, horses, mules, sheep, swine,
and other livestock, all animals are rendered insensible to pain by a single blow or
gunshot or an electrical, chemical or other means that is rapid and effective, before
being shackled, hoisted, thrown, cast, or cut .... "). The statute also deems
methods of slaughter practiced by certain religions humane. Id. § 1902(b) (noting
that slaughtering in accordance with Jewish traditions or "any other religious faith
that prescribes a method of slaughter whereby the animal suffers loss of
consciousness by anemia of the brain caused by the simultaneous and
instantaneous severance of the carotid arteries with a sharp instrument and
handling in connection with such slaughtering" are humane for purposes of the
statute).
64. See id. § 1902(a) (listing animals to which the statute applies, including
"cattle, calves, horses, mules, sheep, swine, and other livestock"); see also Fox,
supra note 39, at 146 n.18 (noting that the HMLSA does not apply to poultry);
Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 31, at 208 ("[R]egulations promulgated pursuant to
the [HMLSA] exempt poultry, the result of which is that over 95 percent of all
farmed-animals.., have no federal legal protection from inhumane slaughter.").
65. See Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 31, at 208 (arguing that "significant
penalties are never imposed" and attempts to promote enforcement have been futile
under the HMLSA).
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The Farm Security and Investment Act of 2002 ("FSIA")66
was passed and signed into law that same year. 67 Although the
original version of the FSIA contained some advances for farm
animal protection, a number of these provisions were removed
before the FSIA was signed into law. 68 The only remaining
protection for farm animals in the FSIA is the Humane Slaughter
of the
Resolution. 69 This provision notes ineffective enforcement
70
existing HMLSA and calls for better enforcement.
Taken together, the four primary federal statutes that
purport to protect animals have limited application to farm
animals. 71 As a result, efforts to reform farm animal conditions
72
have been undertaken in recent years by Congress.
2.

Recent Attempts to Strengthen Federal Animal
Protection Law

The most recent attempt to pass federal legislation protecting
73
farm animals was the Downed Animal Protection Act ("DAPA").
The DAPA required the humane treatment of downed animals
raised for food production. 74 The DAPA passed the Senate in 2002
66. 7 U.S.C. § 1907 (2004).
67. See Keturakis, supra note 46, at 332.
68. See id. at 334 (describing the removal of the downed animal amendment
that "would have prohibited the marketing and dragging of downed animals that
are too sick or injured to walk and required these incapacitated animals to be
humanely euthanized").
69. See id. at 333.
70. See id. at 334 ('The resolution calls for the complete enforcement of the
Humane Slaughter Act, the resumption of tracking of violations that occur, and a
report of the USDA's findings to Congress annually."). At least one article has
interpreted the Humane Slaughter Resolution as an indication of the complete
failure of the HMLSA to adequately protect farm animals. See Wolfson & Sullivan,
supra note 31, at 208 ('This may be one of the few occasions where Congress has
felt the need to, in effect, reenact an existing statute, though it did not increase the
likelihood of compliance by requiring fines or other significant penalties for
violations.").
71. See supra notes 49-70 and accompanying text.
72. See infra Part II.A.2.
73. Downed Animal Protection Act, S. 1298, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003) (as
introduced); H.R. 2519, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003) (as introduced).
74. See Emilie Clermont, 2003 Legislative Review, 10 ANIMAL L. 363, 367-70
(2004) (noting that the Downed Animal Protection Act "requires the Secretary of
Agriculture to promulgate regulations to provide humane treatment, handling, and
disposition of downed livestock, including a requirement that such animals be
immediately and humanely euthanized"). Downer animals are those animals that
have become so sick as a result of intensive confinement that they can no longer
stand. See O'Brien, supra note 39, at 408 n.9 ("Downers are animals too sick to
Downer animals are frequently subjected to
walk unaided to slaughter.").
completely inhumane treatment. See Clermont, supra,at 368-69. Clermont states:
Downed animals are routinely pushed with tractors or forklifts, kicked,
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and 2003, but it was not signed into law, due to pressure from the
75
White House.
In 2001, Senators Patrick Leahy and Peter Fitzgerald
introduced the Leahy-Fitzgerald Forced Molting Amendment to
the Senate Agricultural Appropriations Bill.7 6 The Senators
designed the amendment to discourage the use of eggs produced
through the use of forced molting.7 7 The Senate ultimately
78
rejected the amendment.
Analysis of recent attempts to reform certain cruel practices
indicates that federal animal protection legislation as applied to
most farm animals is limited.7 9 In addition, it is clear that federal
An
law treats animals as mere articles of commerce.80
examination of state legislation pertaining to animal cruelty
reveals a similar lack of application to farm animals.8 1

dragged with chains, prodded with electric shocks in efforts to move them at
Additionally, sick or injured
auction and slaughterhouse facilities ....
downer animals are left to suffer for hours or days without proper food, water,
or veterinary care.
Id.
75. See Clermont, supranote 74, at 370.
76. See Fulkerson, supra note 46, at 279 (reporting that in 2001 "Senators
Patrick Leahy (D-VT) and Peter Fitzgerald (R-IL) introduced an amendment to the
Senate Agricultural Appropriations Bill, S. 1191, which would curb the cruel
practice of forced molting .... !).
77. See id. (observing that the Amendment would have barred the USDA "from
purchasing eggs for the Federal School Lunch Program from producers that engage
in the practice [of forced molting]"). Forced molting involves starving chickens so
that they lay more eggs. See Tao, supra note 40, at 343 (describing the "accepted
industry practice" of starving egg-laying chickens "to make them enter the next
laying cycle").
78. See Fulkerson, supra note 46, at 280 ("[The House version of the Bill, H.R.
2330, passed in both the House and the Senate, and was signed into law on
November 28, 2001. The House version did not include the amendment." (citation
omitted)).
79. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
80. See 7 U.S.C. § 2131 (2004) (characterizing animals as articles of commerce);
id. § 1901 (referring to livestock as "products"). As another example, the TwentyEight Hour Law is part of Title 49 of the United States Code, which regulates
transportation of goods across interstate lines. See 49 U.S.C. § 80502 (2004). The
agribusiness industry also uses language designed to obscure its exploitation of
farm animals. See Corwin R. Kruse, Baby Steps: Minnesota Raises CertainForms
of Animal Cruelty to Felony Status, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1649, 1651 n.10
(2002) (arguing that "animal-use industries . . . use impersonal terms such as
'crops,' 'tools,' or 'resources' to refer to animals and speak of their killing
euphemistically (e.g., 'harvesting')").
81. See infra Part I.B.
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B. State Law
1. State Anti-Cruelty Legislation
Every state has some version of an anti-cruelty statute that
is purportedly designed to protect animals from human cruelty.8 2
Anti-cruelty statutes directly protect certain animal interests.83
Punishments for violations of these statutes vary,84 with the
majority of states electing to treat certain violations of their anticruelty statutes as felonies.8 Most states exempt farm animals
from the protection of their anti-cruelty laws.8 6
This is
accomplished via legislation by exempting farm animals from the
definition of "animal," 7 or by exempting animal husbandry
practices from the operation of a state's anti-cruelty statute. 88

82. See Pamela D. Frasch et al., State Animal Anti-Cruelty Statutes: An
Overview, 5 ANIMAL L. 69, 69 (1999) ("Every state has an animal anti-cruelty
statute."); Paula J. Frasso, The Massachusetts Anti-Cruelty Statute: A Real Dog-A
Proposalfor a Re-draft of the Current Law, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1003, 1010 (2001)
("All fifty states have enacted some form of a criminal statute to protect animals,
either mandating minimum levels of care that need to be provided or prohibiting
certain types of acts.").
83. See David Favre, Integrating Animal Interests into Our Legal System, 10
ANIMAL L. 87, 92-93 (2004) ("Unlike Congress, states can and have created laws
protecting the interests of animals. .. . There is no similar law that prohibits an
owner of other types of property from harming that property.").
Some
commentators contend that the main purpose of anti-cruelty statutes is the
protection of human interests rather than animal interests. See, e.g., Kruse, supra
note 80, at 1661 (arguing that anti-cruelty laws in Minnesota have primarily
focused on "human morality rather than animal suffering").
84. See Amie J. Dryden, Overcoming the Inadequacies of Animal Cruelty
Statutes and the Property-Based View of Animals, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 177, 178 (2001)
(noting wide variation in punishment under state anti-cruelty statutes); Frasch et
al., supra note 82, at 69 (noting that some states treat a violation as a misdemeanor
while others treat a violation as a felony).
85. Compare Frasch et al., supra note 82, at 69 (observing that twenty-three
states provide for felony anti-cruelty prosecutions) with Clermont, supra note 74, at
388 (finding that, only four years later, forty-one states have felony anti-cruelty
legislation).
86. See Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 31, at 212 (observing that "the farmedanimal industry has persuaded the majority of state legislatures ... to simply
exempt all 'accepted,' 'common,' 'customary,' or 'normal' farming practices"). Recent
years have seen a growing number of states enacting some form of exemption for
farm animal practices from state anti-cruelty statutes. See id. ("Since 1990,
fourteen states have joined the growing majority of jurisdictions that have enacted
such amendments [to exempt farm animal practices from criminal animal cruelty
statutes].").
87. See Frasch et al., supra note 82, at 78 (reporting that Iowa and Utah
specifically exclude farm animals from their anti-cruelty statute's definition of
"animal"); O'Brien, supra note 39, at 408 (noting that "some statutes exclude farm
animals altogether from the definition of 'animal').
88. See Frasch et al., supra note 82, at 77 (noting that thirty states exempt
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Where the legislature has not exempted farm animals from
coverage under an anti-cruelty statute, the state has usually
89
allowed the farming industry to define what "cruelty" means.
Where statutes do not exempt farm animals explicitly from the
protection of anti-cruelty laws, courts have implicitly exempted
farm animals from such protection. 90 "[T]here are no state [anticruelty] statutes that specifically protect farm animals and
loopholes and exceptions in existing laws allow farm animals to
remain unprotected."91
In addition to the definitional problems discussed above,
cases involving animal cruelty are rarely prosecuted. 92 Where
animal cruelty cases are prosecuted, they usually involve
companion animals. 93 Animal cruelty convictions are difficult to
"commonly accepted animal husbandry practices"); Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note
31, at 212 n.20 (listing twenty-six states that exempt "all customary farming
practices," and five states that provide varying exemptions for certain industry
practices).
89. See Laura J. Ireland, Canning Canned Hunts: Using State and Federal
Legislation to Eliminate the Unethical Practiceof Canned "Hunting,"8 ANIMAL L.
223, 238-39 (2002) ("State legislatures have left the task of defining 'common' or
'normal' husbandry practices to the industries themselves."); Wolfson & Sullivan,
supra note 31, at 215 ("State legislatures have endowed the farmed-animal
industry with complete authority to define what is, and what is not, cruelty to the
animals in their care."). For example, some states allow schools to define what a
customary farming practice is. See id. at 213 (stating that Tennessee defines a
customary farming practice as "whatever a 'college of agriculture or veterinary
medicine' says it is"). Wolfson and Sullivan note that allowing the industry to
define what constitutes criminal conduct is unheard of in criminal law. See id. at
215 (' The customary farming exemptions.., are a unique legal development in
that they delegate criminal enforcement power to the industry itself. It is difficult
to imagine another non-governmental group possessing such influence over a
criminal legal definition ...").
90. See Francione, supra note 30, at 118 (arguing that "courts have held
consistently that animals used for food may be mutilated in ways that
unquestionably cause severe pain and suffering").
91. Mosel, supra note 39, at 139.
92. See Jennifer H. Rackstraw, Reaching for Justice: An Analysis of Self-Help
Prosecutionfor Animal Crimes, 9 ANIMAL L. 243, 245-46 (2003) (cataloging research
demonstrating that a disproportionately small number of reported cruelty cases are
prosecuted); see also Frasch et al., supra note 82, at 69-70. Frasch observes that
[t]here is anecdotal evidence... to indicate that some prosecutors are less
likely to charge or prosecute animal cruelty compared to other violent crimes,
except in the most extreme cases. This apparent reluctance to prosecute
stems from many factors including: real or perceived limited resources;
inexperienced staff; incomplete or botched investigations; pressure from the
community to focus on other crimes; and personal or political bias against
taking animal abuse seriously as a violent crime.
Id.; DA Declines to File Charges in California Wood Chipper Case, The Humane
Society of the United States (reporting failure of San Diego County District
Attorney to prosecute owners of egg farm who killed thousands of live chickens by
"throwing them into wood chippers") (on file with author).
93. See Remarks: The Legal Status of Nonhuman Animals, 8 ANIMAL L. 1, 6
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obtain because they are often criminal charges that require proof
of a mens rea element. 94 A conviction under a state animal cruelty
statute does not usually result in a substantial penalty for the
criminal. 95 Finally, most states do not protect farm animals
through the use of regulatory legislation, with the exceptions
96
noted below.
2. Recent Attempts to Strengthen State Farm Animal
Protection Through the Use of Regulatory Legislation
Recent years have seen the introduction and passage of a
number of pieces of regulatory legislation that protect farm
animals in some way. 97 The most significant development in 2004
at the state level was California's new ban on the sale and
production of foie gras in the state. 98 New York has similar
(2002) (commenting that most prosecutions are only in cases of egregious abuse of
companion animals); Wolfson, supra note 60, at 131 ("[Elnforcement is largely
directed at dogs, cats, and horses rather than animals raised for food or food
production."). There are occasional prosecutions of farm animal owners. See Julian
Guthrie, Custody Fight Looms over Seized Sheep, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 20, 2004, at
A21 (describing attempt to prosecute man who had kept sheep in a junkyard).
94. See Francione, supra note 30, at 118. An excellent example of the difficulty
of securing a conviction under criminal anticruelty statutes can be found in a New
Jersey case that involved prosecution of an agribusiness firm for discarding live
chickens in trash cans. See SCULLY, supra note 39, at 285 (reporting that ISE
America's conviction for animal cruelty was overturned because the state could not
prove that the workers intentionally neglected the birds); Lori Montgomery,
Activists Accuse Egg Farm of Cruelty, WASH. POST, June 6, 2001, at B5 (observing
that ISE America's misdemeanor conviction and $564 fine "were overturned when a
judge found insufficient evidence that farm workers had maliciously neglected the
birds").
95. See Francione, supra note 30, at 118 (stating that "many animal welfare
laws have wholly inadequate penalty provisions"). Despite this assessment, states
are increasingly creating felony anti-cruelty legislation. See Clermont, supra note
74 at 388 ("Kentucky, Nebraska, West Virginia and Wyoming became the thirtyeighth, thirty-ninth, fortieth, and forty-first states to have felony anti-cruelty
legislation on the books. Similar legislation failed in Arkansas, Hawaii, and
Kansas." (citation omitted)).
96. See infra Part II.B.2.
97. See infra notes 98-105 and accompanying text.
98. See 2004 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 904 (Deering). The California statue
prohibits persons from
force feeding a bird for the purpose of enlarging the bird's liver beyond normal
size, or hir[ing] another person to do so .... [A] product may not be sold in
California if it is the result of force feeding a bird for the purpose of enlarging
the bird's liver beyond normal size.
Id.; Patricia Leigh Brown, Is Luxury Cruel? The Foie Gras Divide, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
6, 2004, at F10 (reporting that "[a]nimal rights groups called the signing [of the bill
banning the sale and production of foie gras] a major victory for the ducks and
geese"). Foie gras is a "food" that is produced by force-feeding ducks and geese by
means of a mechanical tube inserted in the esophagus that enlarges the liver of the
animals to monstrous sizes. See id. (explaining that animal rights activists object
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legislation pending. 99 In addition, a number of states saw the
introduction of bills that would regulate the confinement of such
Bills concerning horse
animals as pigs100 and calves. 10 1
10 3
The most
slaughter 0 2 and tail docking were also considered.
radical proposal recognized the sentient status of farm animals
and demanded that they be treated humanely and with respect.104
In 2002, Florida voters approved an initiative that banned the use
of gestation crates for sows. 0 5 In sum, animal advocates have
to foie gras "because it is made by force-feeding ducks and geese to create creamy,
fat-engorged livers"); Holly Anne Gibbons, Origins of Animal Law: Three
Perspectives, 10 ANIMAL L. 8, 10 n.13 (2004) (describing foie gras as "a 'delicacy'
produced from the grotesquely enlarged livers of ducks and geese who were cruelly
force-fed"). The California ban on foie gras does not take effect until 2012. See
2004 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 904 (Deering). The California statute declares:
No civil or criminal cause of action shall arise on or after January 1, 2005, nor
shall a pending action commenced prior to January 1, 2005, be pursued under
any provision of law against a person or entity for engaging, prior to July 1,
2012, in any act prohibited by this chapter.
Id.
Sess. (N.Y.. 2005), available at
2005-06 Reg.
99. See S. 2083,
http://assembly.state.ny.uslleg/?bn=s2083 (last visited Mar. 29, 2005) (proposing a
bill that makes it unlawful to force-feed an animal "effectively banning the forcefeeding of geese for the production of foie gras").
100. See S.B. 470, 2005 Leg., (Md. 2005) (proposing a ban on confinement or
tethering of a pig during the "pre-birthing period"); H.R. 2199, 22nd Leg. (Haw.
2004), available at http://capitol.hawaii.gov/session2004/statusHB2199.asp (last
visited Mar. 29, 2005) (proposing a bill that prohibits confining or tethering calves
or pigs "in such a way that prevents [them] from turning around in a complete
circle without touching any side of the enclosure, lying down in full lateral
recumbency, or grooming [themselves] completely").
101. See Assem. B. No. 732, 2003-04 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003) (proposing a bill that
prohibits confining or tethering calves so that they are "unable to turn around
freely, lie down with their legs and neck outstretched, or groom themselves" and
sets penalties of up to one year imprisonment and a fine of up to $1,000); H.R.
2199, 22nd Leg. (Haw. 2004); Assemb. No. 329, 211th Leg., 2004 Sess. (N.J. 2004)
(requiring that calves raised for veal have enough room to turn around, lie down,
and groom, and that they be fed a diet sufficient in iron and fiber).
102. See H.B. 1171, 94th Gen. Assemb., (Ill. 2005), available at
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=1171&GAID=8&DocTypeI
(last visited Mar, 29, 2005)
D=HB&LegId=15911&SessionID=50&GA=94
(proposing a bill that makes it unlawful to slaughter horses for human
consumption or to possess, import, export, sell, buy, or give away horse meat for
human consumption).
103. H.B. 678, 2003-04 Sess. (Vt. 2004) (citing a now-dead bill that required the
state veterinarian to study scientific literature on the tail docking of dairy cows and
determine whether the practice lacks significant benefit, and, if so, requiring the
state veterinarian to actively discourage it, except in cases where it is necessary for
the health of a cow).
at
available
2005),
(Haw.
Leg.
1669,
23rd
H.R.
104. See
(proposing a bill
http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2004/status/HB1669.asp
recognizing farm animals as sentient beings who should be protected and treated
with respect).
105. See Joseph Lubinski, The Cow Says Moo, the Duck Says Quack, and the Dog
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been active at the state level in proposing and sometimes passing
legislation that offers some measure of protection to farm
animals. 106 However, farm animals remain outside of the purview
07
of most state legislation that purports to protect animals.1
State and federal legislation remain largely unconcerned
with the plight of farm animals. 0 8 Given this indifference, a
number of organizations respond to the problem of cruel farmedanimal practices in a variety of ways. 109
III. The Great Divide: Abolition or Regulation?
A. Differences in Ideology: Animal Rights vs. Animal
Welfare
Advocates for animals are generally split into two camps:
animal rights activists and animal welfare activists. 110 As the
name suggests, animal rights supporters seek to grant rights to
non-human animals."' Accordingly, animal rights theorists and
activists generally advocate a non-property legal status for
animals. 112
Proponents of animal rights tend to reject any

Says Vote! The Use of the Initiative to Promote Animal Protection, 74 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1109, 1129 n.130 (2003).
106. See supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text.
107. See supra Part 1IB.1. Ironically, the application of early anti-cruelty
statutes was usually limited to farm animals. See Kruse, supra note 80, at 1660
(discussing United States v. Gideon, 1 Minn. 226 (1856), in which the Supreme
Court of Minnesota held that the anti-cruelty laws of the territory of Minnesota did
not apply to the shooting of a dog because it was not a "commercially valuable"
animal).
108. See supra notes 49-107 and accompanying text.
109. See infra Part III.A.
110. See GARY L. FRANCIONE, RAIN WITHOUT THUNDER: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE
ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 25-27 (1996) (comparing the arguments of animal
welfarists and animal rights advocates); Ruth Payne, Animal Welfare, Animal
Rights, and the Path to Social Reform: One Movement's Struggle for Coherency in
the Quest for Change, 9 VA. J. SOC. POLY & L. 587, 593 (2002) (identifying animal
rights and animal welfare as the two main branches of modern activism on behalf
of animals).
111. See Tresl, supra note 49, at 278 ("An animal rights activist believes animals
should be granted rights separate and apart from humans.").
112. See, e.g., Francione, supra note 30, at 108 (arguing that the only way for
humans to secure humane treatment for animals is to grant animals the right not
to be treated as the property of humans); Thomas G. Kelch, Towards a NonProperty Status for Animals, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 531, 532 (1998) (arguing that the
property status of animals needs to be abolished and the common law is the proper
mechanism to accomplish this change). But see Favre, supra note 83, at 90
(arguing that the pursuit of a non-property status for animals is "unwise and
unnecessary"). Favre believes that animals would be better served by a new quasiproperty classification. See David Favre, Equitable Self-Ownership for Animals, 50
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instrumental use of animals for human purposes. 113 This usually
includes the use of animals for food purposes; the animal rights
position thus implicitly (if not explicitly) seeks the ultimate
abolition of the "meat" industry. 114 In addition, some proponents
of the animal rights perspective argue that the animal welfare
ideology results in enhanced exploitation of non-human animals. 115
As a consequence, some animal rights activists discourage
16
litigation in favor of the pursuit of other non-legal goals."
By contrast, the animal welfare position seeks to lessen the
suffering of non-human animals exploited by humans for various
purposes." 7 Accordingly, the animal welfare movement does not
advocate for the abolition of the meat industry or other
exploitative uses of animals; it merely works to alleviate the most
egregious examples of animal suffering. 11 The main distinction
between rights-oriented animal advocates and animal welfare
advocates is the latter's tolerance of practices that exploit animals
for human benefit and the former's complete rejection of such
exploitation. 11 9 The most significant distinction in legal strategy is
the animal right emphasis on the abolition of the property status
of non-human animals versus the animal welfarist acceptance of

DUKE L.J. 473, 476 (2000) (arguing that animal interests can be accommodated
within the current legal regime by "transferring the equitable title of an animal to
See
the animal, creating for the animal a limited form of self-ownership").
generally Robert Garner, Political Ideology and the Legal Status of Animals, 8
ANIMAL L. 77 (2002) (arguing that advances toward animal rights can be made
without eliminating the property status of animals).
113. See Tresl, supra note 49, at 279 ("Activists have two goals: (1) to end all use
of animals and (2) to move away from animals being considered property owned by
people.").
See generally TOM REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS (1983)
(espousing a theory of animal rights that rejects use of animals by humans).
114. See, e.g., REGAN, supra note 113, at 331-53.
115. See FRANCIONE, supra note 110, at 229-30 (lambasting animal welfare
movement for "marching backwards" on issues related to animal protection).
116. See Payne, supra note 110, at 615 (summarizing arguments of certain
animal rights activists who believe that spending money on litigation rather than
on other goals is not money well spent).
117. See id. at 595 ("In general, the goal of the animal welfare movement is to
prevent animals from suffering needlessly, and thereby to improve the quality of
animal lives. This goal can be achieved, then, through measures designed to
alleviate the suffering of animals in all settings in which humans interact with
them.").
118. See FRANCIONE, supra note 110, at 7-12 (discussing the drive of animal
welfare groups to enact legislation that protects animals rather than eradicates
their usage by humans).
119. See, e.g., Payne, supra note 110, at 597 ("[The Animal rights movement],
therefore, is not content just to improve the conditions under which animals live,
but rather seeks to alter human conceptions of animals altogether.").

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 23:363

property status for non-human animals. 120 As a result, animal
welfare proponents are likely to pursue litigation seeking
enforcement of existing animal protection statutes rather than
attempting to substantially change existing law. 121 Proponents of
the animal welfare approach argue that media attention generated
by litigation is one of the primary benefits of an incremental
122
litigation strategy.
Although there are many differences of opinion between
animal rights activists and animal welfare activists, there is a
substantial amount of common ground. 23 Many advocates of
animal rights acknowledge the need for gradual reform of the legal
system. 24 Both groups acknowledge that public support is critical
25
to make progress in protecting animals and to achieve reform.'
Animal welfare and animal rights activists share the conviction
that animals have interests that should be honored and
respected. 26 Both groups recognize that reform in the area of
127
animal law is likely to be gradual.
Most commentators, whether animal welfare or rights
advocates, appear to favor a federal solution to the problem of

120. See FRANCIONE, supra note 110, at 9-10 (arguing that animal welfarism
views animals as property).
121. See Payne, supra note 110, at 603 ("[M]uch of the litigation undertaken by
the animal welfare movement has aimed to better enforce laws that already exist
rather than create new laws.").
122. See id. at 610-11 (articulating the argument that court cases revolving
around existing animal protection law may generate public awareness and
increased funding for animal advocacy groups).
123. See HELENA SILVERSTEIN, UNLEASHING RIGHTS: LAW, MEANING, AND THE
ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 36-37 (1996) (arguing that advocates for animals have
achieved consensus on many issues); Tresl, supra note 49, at 279 (noting the
"shared opposition to 'hunting, trapping, fur wearing, intensive animal agriculture,
and animal experimentation"' between animal rights and welfare groups).
124. See, e.g., Steven M. Wise, Animal Rights, One Step at a Time, in ANIMAL
RIGHTS, supra note 30, at 27 ("I believe that legal rights for nonhuman animals will
be achieved one step at a time."); Favre, supra note 83, at 90-91 (advocating
gradual reform in the animal law area); Cass R. Sunstein, The Rights of Animals,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 392-95 (2003) (suggesting a gradual approach to promotion
of animal rights and welfare). But see FRANCIONE, supra note 110, at 229-30
(arguing that "gains" made by the animal welfare movement undermine the
pursuit of animal rights). It is important to note that Francione also recognizes the
need for incremental change, albeit incremental change that is far less incremental
than the kinds of reforms suggested by animal welfare advocates. See id. at 189
(arguing that incremental approaches are possible for animal rights activists and
that such approaches must reject the notion of animals as property).
125. See Payne, supra note 110, at 631.
126. See id. at 594-96.
127. See, e.g., Wise, supra note 124, at 27 (observing the likelihood of gradual
change in the legal status of non-human animals).
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Commentators have generally
farm animal mistreatment. 128
argued that Congress should use its Commerce Clause 129 power to
enact a federal statute that protects farm animals. 13 0 Both animal
rights and animal welfare lobbying groups are small in number
and have far less funding to pursue legislative change than other
lobbying groups. 131 As a result, the attitude of the general132public
is of vital importance in determining how to pursue reform.
B. Public Support for Animal Protection
There appears to be widespread support in the general public
for limited animal welfare measures. 133 One striking example of
this is the growing popularity of organic and free-range animal
Animals raised by the organic and free-range
products.134
128. See SCULLY, supra note 39, at 391 (proposing a federal "Humane Farming
Act" to counter the abuses rampant in the agribusiness industry); Mosel, supra
note 39 (arguing that a federal statute should be enacted that would give greater
protection to farm animals); Wolfson, supra note 60, at 149 (suggesting federal
legislation to protect farm animals); see also Tao, supra note 40, at 353-54 (calling
for federal legislation and a new federal agency to enforce regulations). It appears
that animal advocates are also loosely associated with the Democratic Party, which
tends to favor a more active federal government in addressing a variety of policy
concerns. See Humane USA Endorses John Kerry For President, Humane USA, at
http://humaneusa.org/article.asp?article-key=-109&n=3 (last visited Mar. 23, 2005)
(endorsing Democrat John Kerry for President). Humane USA is "the nation's first
major political action committee devoted to the task of electing humane-minded
candidates to public office at the federal and state levels." About Us, Humane USA,
at http://humaneusa.org/about/index.asp (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
129. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("Congress shall have the Power... to regulate
Commerce ...among the several States.").
130. See Fox, supra note 39, at 168-69; Mosel, supra note 39, at 184 (suggesting
that Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate factory
farming). Regulation of factory farms may be permissible either directly under the
Commerce Clause or using the aggregation standard announced in Wickard v.
Fillburn,317 U.S. 111 (1942). See Fox, supra note 39, at 168; Mosel, supra note 39,
at 184 (discussing application of aggregation standard in the context of factory
farming regulation). Fox also suggests that factory farms might be subject to
regulation due to their anti-competitive effect. See Fox, supra note 39, at 169
(arguing that regulation of factory farms is analogous to the lumber industry
regulation held to be allowable in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941)).
131. See Megan A. Senatori, The Diverging Paths of Animal Activism and
Environmental Law, 8 WIS. ENVTL. L.J. 31, 44 (2002) ("[Ihe disparity in budgets
and power between animal organizations and corporate or other lobbying groups
places animal activists at a distinct disadvantage.").
132. See infra Part III.B.
133. See Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction: What Are Animal Rights?, in ANIMAL
RIGHTS, supra note 30, at 3, 5 ('Many of the goals of animal welfare groups receive
broad popular approval."); Francione, supra note 30, at 109 ("Two-thirds of
Americans polled by the Associated Press agree with the following statement: 'An
animal's right to live free of suffering should be just as important as a person's
right to live free of suffering .. "').
134. See Carter Dillard, False Advertising, Animals, and Ethical Consumption,
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industries are typically treated in a more humane fashion than
animals raised in "conventional" agribusiness environments. 135
Conversely, there appears to be little popular support for the
animal rights perspective. 136 However, awareness of animal rights
issues appears to be increasing, as younger generations
increasingly adopt vegetarian or vegan lifestyles 37 or eat
increasing amounts of Vegetarian or vegan food.138 It is equally
clear that the general public does not support the abolition of meat
1 39
consumption or production at any time in the near future.
Given the relative reticence of the voting public to institute
widespread change, along with the limited resources of animal
advocacy organizations, it is important to consider the costs and
benefits of pursuing progressive legislative reform at both the
state and federal levels. 140

10 ANIMAL L. 25, 26 n.2 (2004) (citing studies indicating that United States citizens
are willing to pay more for food that is "humanely raised"); Frank J. Miskiel,
Voluntary Labeling of Bioengineered Food: Cognitive Dissonance in the Law,
Science, and Public Policy, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 223, 223 n.2 (2001) (describing the
growing popularity of organic foods).
135. Benjamin N. Gutman, Ethical Eating:Applying the Kosher Food Regulatory
Regime to Organic Food, 108 YALE L.J. 2351, 2359-60 (1999) (contrasting the
relatively humane treatment of livestock in the organic industry with the intensive
confinement methods used by mainstream agribusiness).
136. See Dennis T. Avery, Intensive Farming and Biotechnology: Saving People
and Wildlife in the 21st Century, in THE MEAT BUSINESS: DEVOURING A HEALTHY
PLANET 16 (Geoff Tansey & Joyce D'Silva eds., 1999) (observing that "[o]nly about
0.2 percent of Americans are vegans"); Francione, supra note 30, at 109 ("[Olur
actual treatment of animals stands in stark contrast to our proclamations about
our regard for [animals'] moral status.").
137. See SCULLY, supra note 39, at 391 (noting that in the United States,
"[sleventeen million people are already vegetarians, most of them teenagers and
college students whose influence in the world has yet to be felt"); Havercamp, supra
note 39, at 649 n.15 (citing figures that "put the number of vegetarians at roughly
12.4 million and growing"). It is also important to note that not all vegetarians or
vegans adopt such a lifestyle because of concerns for animal well-being. See id.
(observing that "[w]hile nearly half of the vegetarians polled attribute their eating
manner to health concerns, other vegetarians' choice of food was attributable to
ethical concerns, including beliefs about animal welfare").
138. See Havercamp, supra note 39, at 650 n.15 (reporting that "nearly 15% of
college students in the United States 'eat vegetarian' daily"); One Out of Every Four
College Students Wants Vegan Meals According to ARAMVARK Nationwide Survey;
Campuses Across Country Offer 'Vegan' this Fall, Bus. WIRE, Oct. 19, 2004
(reporting that in a survey of 100,000 college students conducted by food service
giant Aramark, "nearly a quarter said finding vegan meals on campus was
important to them").
139. See Avery, supra note 136, at 17 ('Today, there is no major visible global
trend toward vegetarian or vegan diets. Nor is there any major global campaign
that seems likely to produce such a trend.").
140. See infra Part IV.
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IV. Achieving Progressive Legislative Change
A. Moving Forward:Is Progressive ChangeMore Typical at
the State Level or the Federal Level?
Historically, progressive change in the United States has
frequently been initiated at the state or local level. 141 Some of the
most notable advances in the area of human rights, including the
abolition of slavery, the civil rights movements, and the
progressive movement, started at the state or local level. 142 By
contrast, the federal government has regularly created regressive
legislation or simply failed to enact progressive legislation
contemporaneously with the states. 143 In the absence of federal
legislation or in addition to federal legislation, individual states
have historically passed their own legislation that is more
progressive than the prevailing national norm. 144 Similarly,
certain state courts grant greater rights to their citizens in certain
circumstances than the federal government is willing to
Despite the progressive tendency in certain
recognize.1 45
141. See Michael S. Greve, Business, the States, and Federalism's Political
Economy, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 895, 904 (2002) (discussing Progressive-era
reforms such as child labor laws, social and health insurance, and health and safety
regulations enacted at the state level that predated similar federal legislation).
142. See Ernst A. Young, Welcome to the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover
Federalism in the Wake of the War on Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1277, 1287-88
(2004).
143. See, e.g., Stephen Clark, Progressive Federalism? A Gay Liberationist
Perspective, 66 ALB. L. REV. 719, 736 (2003) (arguing that individual states and
municipalities have enacted progressive legislation with respect to gay rights
issues in spite of a lack of similarly progressive federal legislation); id. at 738-39
(contending that individual states created progressive legislation during the
abolition movement of the nineteenth century and the civil rights movement of the
1960s while the federal government sought to protect the institution of slavery and
lagged behind certain states in banning discrimination).
144. See id. at 720-21 (discussing the relatively progressive legislation of certain
states and municipalities on the issue of gay rights); Deborah J. Merritt,
Federalism as Empowerment, 47 FLA. L. REV. 541, 545-46 (1995) (cataloging
progressive state legislation enacted during the Reagan era).
145. See, e.g., N.J. Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty
Corp., 650 A.2d 757 (N.J. 1994) (holding that a shopping mall is a public place and
protestors have a free speech right under state constitution to protest at mall);
Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992) (decriminalizing homosexual
sodomy in the state of Kentucky eleven years before the Supreme Court
decriminalized homosexual sodomy). But see State v. Smith, 725 P.2d 894 (Or.
1986) (concluding the state constitutional right to remain silent provides less
protection than federal protection). It is important to note that state courts have a
pronounced tendency to follow federal court interpretation of constitutional
language. See Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, Federalism, Liberty, and
Constitutional Law, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1457, 1459 (1997) (arguing that state
court judges tend to follow federal precedent in individual rights cases). State court
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individual states, these states are limited by the tendency of
businesses to relocate to states with less stringent regulation. 146
As a consequence, progressive federal legislation and court
doctrine has frequently developed in response to progressive
147
developments at the state and local level.
States continue to pass progressive legislation in policy areas
where the federal government is reluctant to act. 148 For example,
149
in addition to its ban on the production and sale of foie gras,
150
California also recently legalized the use of medical marijuana.
Furthermore, many states enacted progressive legislation directed
at protecting homosexuals, 151 and a number of states moved
strongly to alleviate gender discrimination. 1 52 Certain state courts
decisions granting more expansive rights than their federal counterparts are thus
the exception, not the rule. See id. ("A case using state law to rise above the federal
floor is a comparatively rare event.").
146. See Greve, supra note 141, at 904 (contending that Progressive experiments
in the individual states were limited by the "threat that business might exit to
more hospitable jurisdictions"). This argument is frequently referred to in legal
literature as "the race to the bottom." See id. A number of commentators have
questioned the validity of the race to the bottom theory in a variety of contexts.
See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in
Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 684 (2002) (arguing that states do not
compete for incorporations and the race to the bottom theory is inapplicable to
corporate law); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition:
Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental
Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992) (questioning the applicability of race to
the bottom theory to environmental regulation). But see Kirsten H. Engel, State
Environmental Standard-Setting:Is There a 'Race" and Is It to the "Bottom'?, 48
HASTINGS L.J. 271, 278-80 (1997) (arguing that race to the bottom theory is
supported by empirical evidence in the area of environmental regulation).
147. See Greve, supra note 141, at 904 (arguing that individual states with
progressive laws lobbied the national government to pass similar legislation in
order to minimize the threat that business might move to more hospitable
jurisdictions).
148. See Young, supra note 142, at 1278 ("On issues ranging from gay marriage
to physician-assisted suicide to environmental protection, individual states have
staked out 'progressive' positions .... ").
149. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
150. See Young, supra note 142, at 1303 (discussing the legalization of medical
marijuana in California for some purposes).
151. See Clark, supra note 143, at 734-35. Clark reports:
Three-quarters of the states have decriminalized private, consensual gay sex.
Over half the states, including the District of Columbia, have enacted hate
crimes laws that include sexual orientation. Approximately one quarter of
the states have enacted gay-inclusive civil rights laws that ban private-sector
employment discrimination, as have more than 140 municipalities.
Furthermore, a small but growing number of states has even recognized
same-sex domestic partners for at least some purposes.
Id. (citations omitted).
152. See Wolfgang P. Hirczy de Mino, Does an Equal Rights Amendment Make a
Difference?, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1581, 1582 (1997) (noting that many states passed
Equal Rights Amendments in the 1970s while the Equal Rights Amendment to the
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also moved to offer greater protection or rights than the protection
or rights granted by federal courts. 153 Increasingly, rights activists
are successfully taking their fight to the individual states in lieu of
the federal government. 5 4 The history of progressive change in
the United States and current trends indicate that individual
states and local municipalities are more receptive to political and
55
social reformers than the federal government.
B. Practical,Structural,and ConstitutionalIssues Related
to Affecting Legislative Change
1. Changing Federal Law
It is notoriously difficult for a small interest group to
effectuate change at the federal level. 56 Any small interest group
faces two primary obstacles in attempting to change federal law to
address the needs of the interest group. First, Congress is an
Second, other interest
inherently majoritarian institution. 57
groups, primarily business lobbying groups, usually oppose small
interest groups. 5 8
Groups that oppose proposed reform are
U.S. Constitution failed); see also Guard v. Jackson, 940 P.2d 642, 643-44 (Wash.
1997) (holding that judicial scrutiny of gender classifications under the Washington
Equal Rights Amendment is more stringent than strict scrutiny).
153. See, e.g., Goodrich v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003)
(holding unconstitutional under state constitution the denial of benefits of marriage
to couple solely on the basis of sexual orientation).
154. See Clark, supra note 143, at 723-27 (describing efforts of gay rights
activists in Washington D.C. to secure progressive legislation); Young, supra note
142, at 1278 (discussing efforts of activists opposed to the "War on Terror" at the
state and local level); see also supra note 98 and accompanying text (noting victory
of animal rights groups in passage of ban on production and sale of foie gras).
155. See supra notes 141-154 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., Norman R. Williams II, Rising Above Factionalism:A Madisonian
Theory of Judicial Review, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 963, 978 (1994) ("While interest
groups with small, cohesive memberships and narrowly defined interests can
overcome organizational impediments, the size and limited legislative agenda of
these groups prevent them-almost by definition-from possessing broad
legislative influence at the federal level.").
157. See, e.g., Michelle Johnston, The Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and the
Sentencing of Sexual Predators, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 39, 75 (1998) (observing
that all three branches of the federal government are essentially majoritarian
institutions). But see Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More
Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 32 (1991) (noting the plethora of
literature suggesting that there exists "a systematic bias in lawmaking that
benefits small groups at the expense of large groups with more votes"); Lee Anne
Fennell, Death, Taxes, and Cognition, 81 N.C. L. REV. 567, 594-95 (2003)
(questioning whether congressional legislation actually follows majoritarian
preferences).
158. See Jimena Uralde, Congress' Failure to Enact Animal Welfare Legislation
for the Rearing of Farm Animals: What is Truly at Stake?, 9 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REV.
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frequently large and powerful lobbying groups at the federal
level. 159 Finally, the cost of pursuing federal legislation may be too
160
expensive for many small interest groups to afford.
In addition to such practical impediments, small interest
groups may also encounter constitutional difficulty in achieving
legislative change at the federal level. In order to pass any
regulatory statute, Congress must find a specific clause in the
Constitution that would empower it to regulate the subject of the
law.161 Congress frequently relies on the Commerce Clause, 62 but
future reliance on that power to enact progressive legislation may
be problematic given the Supreme Court's recent contraction of
federal power under the Commerce Clause. 163 In particular,
federal criminal statutes may not be easily sustained by the

193, 214 (2001) ("Strong opposition from animal producers to any attempt to extend
protection to farm animals remains likely, since agribusiness has an important
stake in maintaining the current husbandry practices." (citation omitted)); see also
O'Brien, supra note 39, at 427 (noting the likely opposition of agribusiness to any
proposed changes of animal husbandry practices by statute).
159. See Miguel Montana-Mora, International Law and InternationalRelations
Cheek to Cheek, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1, 36 (1993) ("We have all heard of
the legendary power of farm lobbies. In the United States, agribusiness interests
are very well organized to influence political decisions. Congressmen receive
financial contributions from farm lobbyists, and also receive the support of
specialized newspapers during the elections."); see also Cheever, supra note 38, at
45 (noting the power of the agribusiness lobby in avoiding enforcement of animal
welfare statutes); Bruce Barcott, Seeds of Discord: Bruce Barcott on the Battle to
Stop Genetically Modified Seeds From Overrunning Organic Farms, LEGAL
AFFAIRS, Jan./Feb. 2003, at 60 ("Agribusiness employs some of the most powerful
lobbyists on Capitol Hill.").
160. See Frank B. Cross, The Judiciary and Public Choice, 50 HASTINGS L.J.
355, 363 (1999) ('The costs of lobbying Congress may be well beyond the capacity of
the average individual or small group, and effective lobbying may exceed the
resources of broad-based public interest groups.").
161. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) ("Every law enacted
by Congress must be based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the
Constitution."); Jeff L. Massey, Swanson Mining Reconsidered: Is Section 7 of the
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act Constitutional Under the Supreme Court's New
Commerce Clause Jurisprudence?,8 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 95, 98
(2001) ("[E]very law enacted by Congress must stem from one of the limited powers
enumerated in the Constitution.").
162. See Christy H. Dral & Jerry J. Phillips, Commerce by Another Name: The
Impact of United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison, 68 TENN. L. REV.
605, 605 (2001) ("Until recently, it seemed established that the Commerce Clause
provided an extremely broad and expansive grant of power to Congress."); Edward
P. Noonan, The ADEA in the Wake of Seminole, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 879, 899 (1997)
("Congress frequently uses the Commerce Clause to legislate in social areas.").
163. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (striking down the Violence Against
Women Act enacted under Commerce Clause authority); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act enacted under
Commerce Clause authority).
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Supreme Court. 164 A non-criminal, regulatory statute has a better
chance at surviving judicial scrutiny than a federal criminal
statute, 165 but there is some suggestion that even regulatory
statutes aimed at certain industries might be struck down by the
current Supreme Court. 166 Finally, it is important to recall that
the commerce power ostensibly allows Congress to regulate
articles of commerce only; Congress has no general police power
167
that it can rely upon to enact legislation.
2.

Changing State Law

State government offers a very different framework in which
small interest groups can operate. State legislative power is
presumed to be plenary. 168 A state legislature is free to enact any
statute that it chooses, subject to limitations contained in the state
and federal constitutions. 169 A state legislature can theoretically
rely on its police power' 76 to enact a broad array of statutes,
164. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610 (striking down criminal statute
criminalizing violence against women because of the noneconomic activity that was
being regulated); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (striking down a statute criminalizing
possession of guns near school zones because of the noneconomic activity that was
being regulated).
165. See Jim Chen, Filburn's Legacy, 52 EMORY L.J. 1719, 1756 (2003) ("Even
advocates of a more constrained view of the Commerce Clause concede that the
constitutional definition of 'commerce' 'includes ... the production of...
merchandise through activities such as manufacturing, farming, and mining."'
(quoting Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce
Clause: Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but
Preserve State Control over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1, 108 (1999))).
166. See id. at 1751 (noting Justice Thomas's concurrence that appears to
advocate a return to prior Commerce Clause jurisprudence, "perhaps by restoring a
narrow definition of 'commerce' distinct from agriculture, manufacturing, and other
activities").
167. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564 (criticizing the idea that the federal government
has a general police power); M. Todd Scott, Kidnapping Federalism:United States
v. Wills and the Constitutionality of Extending Federal Criminal Law into the
States, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 753, 763-64 (2003) (explaining Congress's
federal police power as a portion of Congress's authority to regulate commerce).
168. See G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 7 (1998)
("[S]tate governments have historically been understood to possess plenary
legislative powers.'); Robert F. Williams, On the Importance of a Theory of
Legislative Power Under State Constitutions, 15 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 57, 58-60
(1995) (noting the plenary character of state legislative power and the historical
bases of the doctrine).
169. See TARR, supra note 168, at 7-8 (observing the relative lack of limitation on
state legislative power). See generally Williams, supra note 168.
170. See Raymond Ku, Swingers: Morality Legislation and the Limits of State
Police Power, 12 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1, 28-29 (1999) (discussing the different
definitions offered to explain the police power of the states and how the police
power doctrine is an inherently troubling concept). The police power is frequently
described as the power to regulate for the purpose of protecting or preserving public
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including animal cruelty laws. 171
States are also the traditional site of enforcement of the
criminal law. 172 This allows states the power to issue moral
condemnation of certain acts by making it a crime to commit those
acts. 173 Criminal law can be a powerful tool in shaping public
attitudes about the acceptability of certain behaviors. 74 Moreover,
individuals protected by the criminal law are elevated to a legal
75
status above that of mere property. 1
In addition to the relative ease of enacting legislation at the
state level, state constitutions frequently allow ways to circumvent
a recalcitrant legislature. 176 For example, many states allow
constitutional amendments through the initiative. 77 In addition,

health, safety, or morals. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569
(1991) (plurality opinion). However, some commentators have contended that the
state police power does not allow the state to regulate solely on the basis of
morality. See, e.g., Ku, supra, at 28-29 (1999) (arguing that the police power does
not extend to "protection of morals alone"). Contra Miranda Oshige McGowan,
From Outgroup to Ingroup: Romer, Lawrence, and the Inevitable Normativity of
Group Recognition, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1312, 1313 (2004) (contending that "moral
distaste" still constitutes a rational basis upon which a state may base statutory
regulation of activity).
171. See M. Varn Chandola, Dissecting American Animal Protection Law:
Healing the Wounds with Animal Rights and Eastern Enlightenment, 8 Wis.
ENVTL. L.J. 3, 7 (2002) (discussing use of police power to enact animal cruelty
laws).
172. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (arguing that certain policy areas, including
criminal law enforcement, have historically been within the province of the
individual states).
173. See Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of
Desert, 76 B.U. L. REV. 201, 206 (1996) (arguing that the layperson views criminal
liability as equivalent to "moral condemnation").
174. See id. at 208 (contending that the existence of a separate regime of
criminal law allows the government to effectively communicate that certain
behaviors are morally unacceptable); Natalie Loder Clark, Crime Begins at Home:
Let's Stop Punishing Victims and PerpetuatingViolence, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV.
263, 276-77 (1987) (articulating the arguments of theorists who contend that
criminal punishment can be a powerful tool for the state to teach citizens why
certain actions are morally wrong).
175. See Richard M. Lebovitz, The Accordion of the Thirteenth Amendment:
Quasi-Personsand the Right of Self-Interest, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 561, 573 (2002)
(arguing that slaves in the antebellum period were regarded as moral persons as
opposed to property because slaves were "protected by criminal law against the
violence of others").
176. See generally Lubinski, supra note 105 (discussing the use of the initiative
and referendum when state legislatures are not responsive to constituent
concerns).
177. See TARR, supra note 168, at 25 (reporting that sixteen states allow
constitutional amendment through a process of citizen proposal directly to the
voters). The initiative should be distinguished from the referendum, another
example of "direct democracy." Lubinski, supra note 105, at 1109. The scholar
argues:
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many states allow citizens to propose legislation and submit it
directly to the people for a vote. 178 State legislative processes offer
179
more varied avenues to reform than parallel federal processes.
Despite this feature, reform at the state level is also subject to
certain limitations that are specific to state legislation. 180

C. The Relationship Between State and FederalLaw:
Federal Preemption and the Dormant Commerce Clause
1. Federal Preemption
An important limitation on the power of state legislatures is
federal preemption. 8 1
The federal government has the
constitutional power to preempt certain state laws. 8 2 Federal
preemption is traditionally analyzed in one of three categories:
preemption, 8 4 and
conflict
express
preemption, 8 3 field
8 5
preemption.
If a federal court finds that a state law is
preempted by federal law or policy, it invokes the Supremacy

The initiative gives a group of citizens the ability to propose legislation
and have that legislation voted on directly by the people... . [Tihe
referendum allows the citizenry to have the final word on whether a bill
passed by the legislature becomes (or remains) law by requiring popular
approval before the measure is given legal effect.
Id. Lubinski also notes that the initiative has been used to promote anti-animal
legislation.
See id. at 1141-42 (discussing successful attempts to enact
constitutional amendments protecting the right to hunt and imposition of supermajority requirement to pass animal protection legislation in Utah).
178. See Lubinski, supra note 105, at 1113 n.22 (observing that twenty-four
states "have some form of initiative and/or statutory referendum system").
179. Compare notes 176-178 and accompanying text with supra notes 73-80 and
accompanying text.
180. See infra Part IV.C.
181. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters: A Different
Approach to Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1313-14 (2004) ("Narrowing the
circumstances of federal preemption leaves more room for state and local
governments to act.").
182. See Susan J. Stabille, Preemption of State Law by Federal Law: A Task for
Congress or the Courts?, 40 VILL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1995) ("Preemption is the power of
the federal government to supplant state law with respect to matters the federal
government has the power to regulate under the Constitution.").
183. See Christi R. Martin, Preemption in the Age of Local Regulatory
Innovation: Fitting the Formula to a Different Kind of Conflict, 70 TEX. L. REV.
1831, 1833 (1995) ("[Fjederal law may be found to preempt state law based on an
explicit expression of congressional intent.").
184. See id. at 1833-34 ("[Clourts may... find that Congress has indicated an
intent to occupy an entire field of regulation.").
185. See id. at 1834 ("[C]ourts may find preemption when a state or local law
actually conflicts with the federal law .... ").
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87
Clause5 6 and invalidates the state law.1
Congress also possesses the specific power to preempt state
criminal law. 8 8 However, preemption of state criminal laws is
relatively rare.18 9 This is due in large part to the fact that federal
preemption of a state criminal law can occur only when the
190
criminal law violates both state and federal criminal law.
Challenges to state economic regulations are a more typical
example of preemption litigation. 191 The current Supreme Court
seems quite receptive to preemption challenges brought by
business interests. 192 Preemption conflicts are increasingly likely
1 93
as rights activists are successful at the state and local level.
Expansive interpretation of the scope of federal preemption
94
doctrine results in decreased authority for state legislatures.

186. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. This section of the Constitution states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance therof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound therby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
187. See Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 342-43
(1997) (describing the constitutional basis for invalidation of state laws that conflict
with federal law or policy).
188. See Adam H. Kurland, First Principles of American Federalism and the
Nature of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction,45 EMoRY L.J. 1, 88 (1996) ("[The federal
government can expressly preempt state criminal laws if it so desires.").
189. See id. (observing that neither express nor implied preemption of state
criminal laws is common); Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New
Principles to Define the Proper Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46
HASTINGS L.J. 979, 997 (1995) ("(T]he contemporary expansion of federal
jurisdiction has not been accompanied by preemption of existing state criminal
laws.").
190. See Kurland, supra note 188, at 82 ("A 'preemption' issue arises when a
state prosecution is commenced by a state prosecutor for a violation of state law
and the alleged act also violates a federal criminal law.").
191. See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, The Three Faces of Federalism:An
Empirical Assessment of Supreme Court Federalism Jurisprudence, 73 S. CAL. L.
REV. 741, 753 (2000) ("Mhe typical contemporary preemption action involves an
effort by business to strike down a state regulatory statute as inconsistent with
federal regulation.").
192. See Chemerinsky, supra note 181, at 1327 (arguing that the Supreme Court
generally strikes down state laws challenged on preemption grounds by business
interests).
193. See Martin, supra note 183, at 1832-33 (arguing that preemption conflicts
are more likely because state and local governments are increasingly addressing
progressive, national, and international issues).
194. See Friedman, supra note 187, at 343 (describing preemption as a way for
Congress to "displace state lawmaking power in any area in which Congress has
regulatory authority").
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The Dormant Commerce Clause

A less obvious limitation on the power of states to enact
legislation is the dormant Commerce Clause. Federal courts
utilize this doctrine to invalidate state laws that interfere with
unexpressed power reserved to Congress by the Commerce
In short, modern dormant Commerce Clause
Clause. 195
jurisprudence functions to invalidate state laws that discriminate
against interstate commerce. 196 The Supreme Court analyzes
dormant Commerce Clause challenges to state legislation in two
steps. 197 First, the Court asks whether the challenged state
legislation facially discriminates against interstate commerce. 198
If so, the law is presumptively invalid and subject to strict
scrutiny. 199 If the state law is not discriminatory on its face, the
Court attempts to balance the burden on interstate commerce that
is created by the state law against the state's interest in enacting
200
the law.
The dormant Commerce Clause is used to invalidate a
variety of state legislation that purportedly interferes with
interstate commerce. 20 1 Federal courts engaged in the analysis of
facially neutral state laws have struck down solid waste disposal
regulations, 20 2 restrictions on the length of trailers, 20 3 and anti195. See id. at 347 ("Under the dormant Commerce Clause courts strike down
state enactments on the ground that they interfere with the concerns underlying
the Commerce Clause, despite the fact that Congress has been completely silent on
the subject.").
196. See id. at 350 (arguing that the Supreme Court seeks to invalidate state
legislation that is protectionist in nature).
197. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994)
(splitting the dormant Commerce Clause analysis into two parts) (citing City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)).
198. See id. at 390.
199. See id. at 392 (holding that "[d]iscrimination against interstate commerce in
favor of local business or investment is per se invalid"); Friedman, supra note 187,
at 350-51 ("Discriminatory, or protectionist, legislation is per se invalid.").
200. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (holding "[w]here
the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest,
and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless
the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits"); Friedman, supra note 187, at 351 ("Second, if a state law
does not discriminate against interstate commerce, then the courts look further to
ensure that the burdens on commerce do not outweigh the benefits to the state of
regulating.").
201. See Friedman, supra note 187, at 353-58 (cataloging recent dormant
Commerce Clause cases that have invalidated state legislation).
202. See Carbone, 511 U.S. 383 (invalidating local ordinance requiring all solid
waste to be processed at a designated transfer station before leaving the
municipality).
203. See Kassel v. Consol. Freightways, 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (striking down Iowa
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corporate farming statutes 2 4 as impermissible state legislation
that discriminated against interstate commerce. Criminal laws
tend to be less susceptible to dormant Commerce Clause challenge
than economic regulations. 2 5 Despite this general tendency,
federal courts have utilized the dormant Commerce Clause to
206
strike down certain state criminal laws.
One of the primary factors in dormant Commerce Clause
analysis of facially neutral laws is evidence of a discriminatory
purpose. 20 7 Federal courts examine statements by state officials
and lobbying groups to probe for evidence of discriminatory
purpose. 20 8 In addition, discriminatory effects on out-of-state
commerce usually accompany discriminatory purposes and tend to
tip the balance against the challenged state regulation. 2 9 Recent

law limiting the length of double tractor-trailers driven on interstate highways in
Iowa).
204. See S.D. Farm Bureau, Inc. v. Hazeltine, 340 F.3d 583 (8th Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 124 S. Ct. 2095 (2004) (invalidating South Dakota constitutional
amendment prohibiting certain corporations from owning farmland and engaging
in farming in South Dakota); Christy Anderson Brekken, South Dakota Farm
Bureau, Inc. v. Hazeltine: The Eighth Circuit Abandons Federalism, Precedent,and
Family Farmers, 22 LAW & INEQ. 347, 362 (2004).
205. See Laura Ann Forbes, A More Convenient Crime: Why States Must
Regulate Internet-Related CriminalActivity Under the Dormant Commerce Clause,
20 PACE L. REV. 189, 204 (1999) (contending that "though incidental burdens may
be placed on interstate commerce during the course of enforcement, such burdens
may be both permitted and inevitable when a state legislates in the name of the
health and safety of its people"); Mark D. Rosen, Extraterritorialityand Political
Heterogeneity in American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 855, 921-22 (2002)
(arguing that the dormant Commerce Clause limits states more strictly in the area
of commerce than in criminal law).
206. See Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(striking down New York criminal law banning dissemination of child pornography
through the Internet on dormant Commerce Clause grounds); see also Sandra
Tozzini, Hair Today, Gone Tomorrow: Equine Cosmetic Crimes and Other Tails of
Woe, 9 ANIMAL L. 159, 175-77 (2003) (discussing the invalidation of state criminal
laws banning horse docking on dormant Commerce Clause grounds).
Horse
docking is a "surgical procedure in which a horse's tail bone is cut, resulting in a
shortened, or bobbed, tail." Id. at 161. Docking has certain negative effects on the
well-being of a horse. See id. at 161-62 ("Horses with shortened tails cannot
effectively swat at flies and other insects, thus tail docking deprives the horse of its
natural flyswatter. Horses also use their tails to communicate a range of emotions
such as excitement, submission, illness, anxiety, or anger." (citation omitted)).
207. See Brekken, supra note 204, at 362 (implying that a finding of
discriminatory purpose in conjunction with discriminatory effect can serve to
invalidate a facially neutral state law).
208. See, e.g., Kassel, 450 U.S. at 677 (analyzing statements of Iowa's governor
and concluding that the law had discriminatory purpose); Hazeltine, 340 F.3d at
593-95 (analyzing statements of lobbying groups and individuals and concluding
that purpose of amendment was discriminatory).
209. See Brekken, supra note 204, at 363 ("Where the court has found
discriminatory purpose, the cases are fact specific and evidence of discriminatory
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history indicates that federal courts deploy the dormant
Commerce Clause aggressively against regulatory legislation that
is arguably non-discriminatory in nature. 210 As in the area of
federal preemption, an expansive reading of the dormant
Commerce Clause results in substantial limitations on the
21
legislative power of states. '
V. The Pursuit of Farm Animal Reform at the State Level:
An Efficient Use of Limited Resources
A. Problems with CurrentLegislation
1.

Shortcomings in Federal Legislation

At the present time, the agribusiness industry is inflicting
various forms of cruelty upon farm animals. 21 2 This cruelty falls
into three primary categories: cruelty in the physical conditions
under which farm animals live; 2 13 inhumane treatment of farm
animals, including physical abuse; 21 4 and inhumane slaughter of
farm animals. 21 5 Each of the federal laws that relate to animal
protection is severely limited in its ability to protect farm
animals. 216 The Animal Welfare Act specifically excludes farm
animals from its coverage and is therefore worthless in protecting
them. 21 7 The Twenty-Eight Hour Law fails to protect most farm
animals transported in the United States because it does not apply
to the trucking industry, the major transporter of farm animals in
the United States. 218 For the limited number of farm animals that
are protected, the Twenty-Eight Hour Law only protects animals

effect is highly relevant to the conclusion of the court.").
210. Id. at 207 (analyzing the Eighth Circuit's aggressive invalidation of South
Dakota's anti-corporate farming amendment); Friedman, supra note 187, at 358
(arguing that recent dormant Commerce Clause decisions reflect a tendency
towards requiring national uniformity).
211. See Michael A. Lawrence, Toward a More Coherent Dormant Commerce
Clause: A Proposed Unitary Framework, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 395, 396
(1998) (arguing that the Supreme Court possesses the ability, through its dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, to allow the individual states broad or minimal
powers to regulate interstate commerce).
212. See supranotes 37-46 and accompanying text.
213. See supranotes 38-41 and accompanying text.
214. See supranotes 42-45 and accompanying text.
215. See supranote 46 and accompanying text.
216. See Fox, supra note 39, at 146-47 (discussing the deficiencies of federal
animal protection statutes).
217. See supranote 53 and accompanying text.
218. See supranote 60 and accompanying text.
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while they are in transport; 219 it does nothing to alleviate the
living conditions, 220 physical abuse, 221 or inhumane slaughter of
animals. 222 Finally, the law allows animals to be confined without
2 23
food, water, or rest for amounts of time that are not humane.
The Humane Methods of Livestock Slaughter Act also suffers
from critical deficiencies. 224 First and foremost, the Act does not
cover poultry; poultry constitute the majority of animals raised for
slaughter in the United States. 225 The Act does not provide for any
fines for violation of the statute, and there are no provisions for
private enforcement of the law. 226 Furthermore, enforcement of
227
the Act is virtually non-existent.
2.

Deficiencies in State Legislation

Unfortunately for farm animals, the cruelty that is routinely
inflicted upon them has not been mitigated by state
governments. 228 In most states, anti-cruelty legislation is useless
for protecting farm animals. 229 First, the majority of statutes
provide loopholes to farmers that eviscerate the protection of the
statute with respect to farm animals. 230 Second, most states
choose to prosecute animal cruelty cases very rarely. 231 When
animal cruelty cases are prosecuted, they usually do not involve
farm animal mistreatment. 232 Because anti-cruelty statutes are
part of the criminal law, it is difficult to secure a conviction. 233 In
the unlikely event that a farm animal owner is convicted, the
penalties for violation of an anti-cruelty statute are frequently

219. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
224. See Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 31, at 207-08 (attacking the
ineffectiveness of the Humane Slaughter Act).
225. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
228. See infra notes 86-96 and accompanying text.
229. See Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 31, at 209-12 (describing the
ineffectiveness of state anti-cruelty statutes).
230. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (showing that, when prosecuted,
animal cruelty cases usually involve companion animals).
233. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (describing the difficulties in
obtaining convictions in animal cruelty cases).
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minimal and thus are an ineffectual deterrent. 234 In light of the
deplorable cruelty that farm animals endure and the paucity of
state or federal legislation that protects farm animals, reform in
this area is sorely needed.
B. PotentialLegislation to Protect Farm Animals: The
Value of a PiecemealApproach
Farm animal advocates should pursue an incremental
strategy that emphasizes animal interests as unique and worthy of
human respect independent of the economic consequences. An
emphasis on the animal rights position is essential in this area
because traditional welfare legislation has not provided for
sufficient protection of farm animals. 235 Specifically, the strategy
of encouraging "humane" treatment of farm animals has resulted
Despite the
in little real progress for farm animals. 236
promulgation of various state and federal statutes that purport to
secure humane treatment for animals, farm animals remain
largely untouched by the current regulatory regime. 237 This is, in
238
part, because farm animals are viewed as property.
Accordingly, farm animal advocates should seek the abolition of
the property status of animals, not merely humane treatment of
239
farm animals.
Animal rights advocates must also recognize that such
wholesale change in the law of the United States and the
individual states is not likely to occur in the near future, given
public opinion about animal rights 240 and the relative strength of
the agribusiness lobby. 241 Rather than cease attempts at litigation
and legislative reform, 242 animal rights advocates should focus
their attention on pressing for legislation and court decisions that
acknowledge animals as more than mere pieces of property. 243 An
234. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (showing the existing criticism of
animal welfare ideology).
236. See supra notes 212-234 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 212-234 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 112-116 and accompanying text (describing the benefits of
non-property approach).
240. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (showing that there is little
popular support for animal rights).
241. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
242. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (stating that animal rights
activists discourage litigation as enhancing exploitation of animals).
243. See supra notes 111-114 and accompanying text (noting that animal rights
ideology generally advocates for a non-property legal status for animals).
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excellent example of such legislation is the unsuccessful bill in
Hawaii that would have recognized farm animals as sentient
beings. 244
Similarly, anti-cruelty legislation that specifically
protects farm animals from cruelty would acknowledge, as do
245
current anti-cruelty statutes that apply to companion animals,
that animals have interests that must be respected regardless of
the economic consequences to humans. Specifically, farm animal
advocates should begin actively pursuing legislation that more
effectively criminalizes cruelty to farm animals.
Admittedly, these suggested reforms do not grant farm
animals rights or completely destroy their status as property.
However, such legislation conveys to the general public the law's
determination to regard animals as having legitimate interests
that must be taken into account. In particular, criminal laws that
punish cruelty to farm animals hold the potential to cement the
status of farm animals as beings that are worthy of moral
consideration. 246 Ultimately, incremental steps can be useful for
instilling the non-property or quasi-property status of animals in
the public consciousness. Such steps could be the first on the long
road to the ultimate abolition of the property status of farm
animals. 247 In addition, incremental reform may also improve the
lives of farm animals that continue to be exploited by the
agribusiness industry. 248 Incremental reform presents a realistic
opportunity for farm animal advocates to accomplish goals and
An analysis of the
improve the lives of farm animals.
governmental framework that reformers must confront is
necessary to determine whether farm animal advocates should
commit their limited resources to pursuit of change at the federal
249
or state level.

244. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (referring to the use of anticruelty statutes to prosecute animal cruelty to companion animals).
246. See supra notes 173-174 and accompanying text (listing scholarly support
for the proposition that criminalization of certain conduct sends a message of moral
reprehensibility of proscribed conduct).
247. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (referring to support by some
advocates of animal rights of the gradual reform of the legal protection of animals).
248. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (stating that the efforts of
animal welfare activists do not relieve all animal suffering).
249. See infra Part V.C.
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C. The State Legal System is a PreferableForum to Pursue
Reform
1.

State Legislation Presents Fewer Constitutional
Obstacles to Change

Pursuing incremental reform that seeks to eradicate the
property status of farm animals at the state level is preferable to
the pursuit of change at the federal level because state law
presents fewer structural obstacles to such change than does
federal law. 250 First, state legislators are not as limited as their
federal counterparts in their authority to promulgate law that
would protect farm animals. 25 1 This is due to the fact that a state
legislature has plenary authority to enact statutes 252 through the
exercise of the police power. 253 This power is significant because it
254
means that a state legislature can protect farm animals directly.
Using their criminal authority, states can directly address the
morality of farm animal cruelty without facing the charge that the
255
adopted legislation is outside of their constitutional authority.
By contrast, federal legislators always need to search for a
constitutional provision that will enable them to regulate the
treatment of farm animals. 256 The obvious choice is the Commerce
Clause, but reliance on it may be problematic given the Supreme
Court's recent contraction of federal power under the Commerce
Clause. 257 Thus, a federal criminal statute that punishes cruel
animal husbandry is unlikely to be sustained by the U.S. Supreme
Court.258 A regulatory statute aimed at protecting farm animals
would certainly have a better chance of surviving judicial
scrutiny, 259 but even a regulatory statute might not be
sustained. 60 The continued treatment of farm animals as mere

250. See supra notes 156-179 and accompanying text (describing the advantages
of pursuing changes in animal protection through state legislation).
251. See supra notes 168-180 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 168-169 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 170-171 and accompanying text (describing the scope of
state police power).
254. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 172-174 and accompanying text.
256. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 163-166 and accompanying text.
258. See supra note 164 and accompanying text (showing that the Supreme
Court is unlikely to uphold a state criminal statute absent implication of economic
activity).
259. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
260. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
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objects of property 261 shows the need for constitutional authority
and prevents Congress from treating farm animals as living beings
that have their own interests.
State governments have always assumed the bulk of criminal
262
prosecution function, so they are also better suited for this task.
This authority enables states to punish the individuals responsible
for farm animal abuse, and the criminal law holds the potential to
stigmatize cruel farm animal husbandry practices. 263 The use of
criminal law to prosecute farm animal cruelty also may change the
general view that farm animals are mere property. 264 By contrast,
the federal government has no general police power and no general
criminal jurisdiction. 265 This is a major structural shortcoming
that serves to hinder any federal efforts to recognize farm animals
as anything more than articles of commerce.
2. Passage of Federal Legislation that Substantially
Protects Farm Animals Is Unlikely
In addition to structural problems at the federal level, farm
animal advocates also face political obstacles at the federal level.
The political reality in the United States is that non-property
status for farm animals is simply not popular at the present
time. 266 Compounding the problem, groups that lobby on behalf of
267
animal interests are few and relatively underfunded.
Agribusiness groups, the likely opponents of farm animal reform,
are large, powerful, and well-funded. 268 Because of these factors,
farm animal advocates, particularly proponents of animal rights,
269
have little chance of success at the national level.
Conversely, the general public seems somewhat receptive to
the idea of animal welfare measures. 270 However, the population
of certain states may be far more receptive to the idea of a non-

261. See supra notes 80, 161-166 and accompanying text (describing how the
limited scope of federal powers affects the prospects of federal protection of animal
rights).
262. See, e.g., supra note 172 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 173-174 and accompanying text (describing how the limited
scope of federal powers affects the protection of animal rights).
264. See supranote 175 and accompanying text.
265. See supranote 167 and accompanying text.
266. See supranote 136 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
268. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 156-160 and accompanying text.
270. See supranotes 133-135 and accompanying text.
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The level of
property status for animals than others. 271
agribusiness influence varies from state to state. 272 In addition,
the cost of pursuing legislation at the state and local level is
substantially less than the cost of pursuing legislation at the
273
federal level.
As a consequence of the receptiveness of certain state
populations, a relative lack of agribusiness influence in such
states, and the relatively low cost of pursuing legislation at the
state level, nearly all progressive legislation directed at farm
animals that has passed in recent years occurred at the state
level. 274 Due to the relative strength of agribusiness in certain
states, progressive farm animal legislation is far more successful
in some states than in others. 275 But the prospect of state-by-state
reform remains attractive because it is less expensive for farm
animal advocacy organizations to pursue, and it allows advocacy
groups to focus their limited resources on states that may be ready
to embrace reform.
3.

State Law Presents Mechanisms for Circumvention of
Recalcitrant Legislatures

Many states have the possibility to utilize direct democracy
mechanisms to force change when agribusiness interests block
change at the state legislature. 276 When managed properly, farm
animal advocates can harness the power of direct democracy to
create legislation or constitutional amendments that protect farm
animals. 277 Specifically, farm animal advocates have utilized the
initiative to pass a constitutional amendment that recognized the
interests of certain farm animals. 278 In addition to its use in
passing constitutional provisions, the initiative can result in the
passage of ordinary legislation that benefits farm animals as

271. See supra notes 98, 104-105 and accompanying text.
272. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
273. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
274. Compare supra notes 73-78, with supra notes 97-106 and accompanying
text (comparing the difficulty in passing federal animal protection laws with the
reduced obstacles in previous state legislative advocacy relating to farm animals).
275. See supra notes 87-96 and accompanying text. It should also be noted that
states with the least agribusiness influence may be the states with a relatively low
number of farm animals. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. Reforms in
such states may be of less practical importance than similar reforms in
jurisdictions with a heavier concentration of agribusiness interests.
276. See supranotes 176-178 and accompanying text.
277. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
278. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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Neither of these options is available at the federal level. As a
result, when agribusiness interests successfully block the passage
of legislation that benefits farm animals, farm animal interest
groups cannot resort to other methods of legislative enactment.
Considering the strength of the national agribusiness lobby,28 ° this
is a very real limitation on the power of farm animal advocates to
press for progressive legislation. Given the differing mechanisms
for passing legislation and constitutional amendments at the state
and federal level, individual states present more fertile ground for
farm animal advocate groups without the organizational capacity
28 1
to effectively pass legislation at the federal level.
4. State Governments Have Traditionally Been Leaders in
Innovation and They Continue to Be Today
There is a stronger possibility of reform at the state level
because certain states have always been historically responsible
for pioneering policies that were incapable of passage at the
federal level. 282 Similarly, certain individual states continue to
pass legislation that is significant because it insists that farm
animals have interests that must be considered. 283 These states
are breaking new ground in considering or passing legislation that
benefits farm animals in a manner similar to that seen with other
progressive social movements. 284 These states have the potential
to become harbingers of a more progressive policy towards farm
animals in all of the states, and ultimately at the federal level as
well. 28 6 Once progressive states legislate on behalf of animals,
they can move in the direction of lobbying for a federal standard
that minimizes the risk of business flight to jurisdictions that are
286
more tolerant of animal cruelty.
By way of comparison, the federal government's record has
been lackluster in promoting the interests of farm animals. 287 The
federal government's continued inability and unwillingness to
protect farm animals has much to do with the constitutional

279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 141-145 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 97-106, 148-153 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 141-142 and accompanying text.
See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 146-147 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A.

2005]

DISMEMBERING THE MEAT INDUSTRY

401

limitations on Congress. 288 In addition, the difficult legislative
and constitutional obstacles to passing legislation that protects
farm animals prevents Congress from acting decisively in this
policy area. 28 9 As in the past, Congress is likely to be a follower,
290
not a leader, in recognizing and expanding farm animal rights.
The prospect of success at the state level should encourage
farm animal advocates to direct their efforts at state and local
governments. In addition, farm animal advocates should consider
the impact that the relative distribution of power between federal
and state governments will have on their efforts to pursue
291
reform.

VI. The Potential Shortcomings of Reliance on State
Legislation to Protect Farm Animals
A.

Preemption by the Federal Government

Although it appears that farm animal advocates have a
better chance of success if they concentrate their efforts at the
state level, 292 there are a number of possible shortcomings with
this strategy. Perhaps the most dangerous scenario involves the
possibility of preemption by the federal government. 293 If farm
animal advocates are too successful at the state level, they may
incur the wrath of the agribusiness lobby.
Agribusiness interests can pursue federal legislation that
Whether state
preempts state law protecting farm animals.
legislation is criminal or regulatory in nature, federal law can
preempt state legislation. 294 If a regressive federal law was passed
in the area of farm animal treatment, a preemption challenge by
agribusiness interests to a state regulatory law that protects farm
295
animals would have an excellent chance of success.
However, this risk is mitigated by the fact that federal
preemption of state criminal law is substantially less frequent
than federal preemption of state regulatory legislation. 296 In
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

See supra notes 256-261 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 256-261 and accompanying text.
See supra note 147-148 and accompanying text.
See infra Parts VI.A-D.
See supra Part VI.C.
See supra Part IV.C.1.
See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
See supranote 191 and accompanying text.
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addition, preemption of a particular state regulation does not
foreclose the possibility that state anticruelty laws directed at
agribusiness would survive a preemption challenge. 297 Finally, if
preemption of a state statute occurred because of express or
conflict preemption, an individual state could attempt to craft a
regulatory scheme that circumvents the preemptive federal law.
B. Dormant Commerce Clause Challenges
In addition to the problem of federal preemption, efforts to
reform state farm animal protection law may face dormant
Commerce Clause challenges. Business interests may challenge a
law that regulates the farmed-animal industry on the grounds
298
that the law discriminates against interstate commerce.
Specifically, any farm animal law reform motivated in part by the
desire to disadvantage out-of-state businesses may lead a federal
court to conclude that the law is motivated by a discriminatory
purpose and invalidate it.299 Similarly, if a statute or amendment
predominantly affects out-of-state interests, a court may also infer
discriminatory purpose. 300 The result could be the invalidation of
30 1
progressive state legislation that is facially neutral.
Farm animal advocates must guard against this possibility
by choosing their allies and their words carefully. They can lessen
the chance of invalidation by distancing themselves from
organizations or statements that avow or imply a desire to
disadvantage out-of-state interests. 30 2 Farm animal advocates
should reiterate that any regulatory legislation is designed only to
benefit farm animals; any discriminatory effects on interstate
commerce must be characterized as purely coincidental or simply
not addressed at all to avoid the appearance of discriminatory
303
purpose.
Furthermore, farm animal advocates can seek to avoid
dormant Commerce Clause invalidation by advocating the passage
of criminal laws rather than regulatory laws. Reformation of an
existing state anti-cruelty statute is far less susceptible to
dormant Commerce Clause challenges than attempts to achieve

297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

See supranotes 189-190 and accompanying text.
See supranote 204 and accompanying text.
See supranote 207 and accompanying text.
See supranote 209 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 202-204 and accompanying text.
See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
See supranote 209 and accompanying text.
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reform through regulatory methods. 30 4 However, farm animal
advocates must remain cognizant of the potential for dormant
Commerce Clause challenges even when criminal laws are at
issue, to limit the potential of dormant Commerce Clause
30 5
invalidation.
C. FarmAnimal Advocates Should Support Efforts to Limit
the Scope of FederalAuthority
Farm animal advocates face a limited threat from federal
Clause doctrine. 30 6
Commerce
preemption and dormant
Accordingly, they should support efforts to limit the scope of
federal preemption doctrine that could potentially destroy gains at
the state level.3 0 7 For the same reason, farm animal advocates
should support efforts to limit the scope of the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine.30 8 Contraction of federal authority in these
doctrinal areas reduces limitations on the authority of state
legislatures. 30 9 Increased potential for regulatory reform allows
farm animal advocates greater leeway to pursue incremental
reform at the state level.
D. ReactionaryActivity at the State Level
In addition to potential problems at the federal level, it is
always possible that progressive activity in one state will lead to
regressive activity in other states. 310 Anti-animal groups have
successfully pursued legislation that attempts to prospectively
curtail progressive efforts at the state level. 311 These groups have
used some of the same mechanisms that allow animal advocates to
pursue meaningful change, including direct-democracy tactics like
31 2
the initiative.
Certain states can and have created economic incentives for
agribusiness to relocate to their state in the form of more
permissive regulatory environments.3 13 As a consequence, the
states that have the most permissive laws for agribusiness tend to

304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
See supra Parts VI.A-B.
See supra Part VI.A.
See supra Part VI.B.
See supra notes 194, 211 and accompanying text.
See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
See supra note 177.
See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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attract factory farms that are prone to promulgating abusive farm
animal environments. 314 To some extent, this situation resembles
yet another "race to the bottom,"3 15 in which certain states attempt
to gut their farm animal regulations in an attempt to draw
agribusiness interests to their states.
The possibility of a "race to the bottom" with respect to farm
animal protection is weakened by the fact that, historically,
competition at the state level has led to federal intervention that
sets a relatively progressive national floor. 316 Even in the event
that a "race to the bottom" would occur, it might still benefit farm
animals in the long run if competition among states leads to a
more progressive federal standard. 317 Furthermore, the imposition
of a federal baseline of protection would not necessarily preclude
individual states from pursuing more stringent regulations or
3 18
criminal laws.
Conclusion
The problem of inhumane treatment of farm animals is of
growing concern to farm animal advocates and the public at
large. 31 9 Despite this concern, there is little state or federal
legislation that regulates the abuse of farm animals 320 and the
legislation that does purport to regulate farm animal living
conditions is woefully inadequate.3 2' The political reality that
farm animal advocates face necessitates a piecemeal approach to
322
progressive farm animal legislation.
For farm animal advocates, pursuit of action at the state
level appears to be preferable to pursuit of action at the federal
level. 323 The broad regulatory and criminal power that the
individual states possess is far more suitable to solving the
problems faced by farm animal advocates than the limited
3 24
constitutional authority that the federal government enjoys.
Certain individual states are far more likely to support reform
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315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

See supra Part I.
See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 148-153 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 133-135 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part V.A.
See supra Part V.B.
See supra Part V.C.
See supra Part V.C.1.
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325
efforts by farm animal advocates than the federal government.
Many states offer animal advocates opportunities to put issues
directly to the voting public when agribusiness interests block
change at the state legislature. 326 Historically and to date, certain
individual state and local governments have been the true
327
pioneers in advancing progressive legislation.
The ultimate pursuit of animal rights and recognition of
animals as more than mere property can be better advanced at the
state level because of the state power to enact general criminal
laws pursuant to their respective police powers. 328 By contrast,
continued reliance on the federal government can only lead to the
continued treatment of farm animals as mere articles of
commerce. 329 Accordingly, farm animal advocates should insist on
a stronger judicial conception of federalism that allows for more
330
state autonomy and less federal intervention.
Pursuit of change at the state level is not without its perils
Agribusiness has a vested interest in
for animal advocates.
passing federal law that preempts progressive state legislation in
the area of farm animal regulation. 331 Similarly, agribusiness
interests may challenge state legislation as violative of the
dormant Commerce Clause. 33 2 Agribusiness interests can also
utilize the unique features of state governments to their
advantage. 333 Finally, progressive state legislation could provoke
a "race to the bottom" in certain states with laws sympathetic to
334
agribusiness interests.
Despite the potential fallout from action at the state level,
the potential benefits of the pursuit of reform at the state level
outweigh the potential costs. Activism at the state level offers the
best hope for animal welfare and rights activists alike to advance
their agenda, dismantle the meat industry piece by piece, and
ultimately eradicate the striking inequalities that persist in the
treatment of farm animals.
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